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I. INTRODUCTION
In the midst of a national health care crisis involving over forty-three mil-
lion uninsured Americans and another fifty million underinsured, a national
debate is waging over the creation of a national health insurance program and
the provision of health care services in this country.' On the sidelines of this
debate, another nationwide conflict has developed over whether nonprofit hos-
pitals and health care providers are fulfilling their charitable mission by provid-
ing enough charity care to patients with limited or no financial means to pay the
exorbitant costs associated with current health care services.2 To add fuel to
that conflict, forty-six lawsuits have been filed in twenty-two states claiming
that nonprofit hospitals are violating their tax-exempt status3 by charging unin-
sured patients premium rates while granting deep discounts to private insurers
and Medicare and Medicaid.4 Newspaper articles abound with stories of unin-
sured and underinsured patients inundated with large hospital bills yet finan-
cially unable to make more than nominal payments per month.5 In a sea of
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J.D., University of Missouri-Columbia School of Law; LL.M., Georgetown University Law
Center. Special thanks to Michelle Arnopol Cecil and Roberta Mann for their constant
support as well as their invaluable comments. Thanks also to the following individuals:
Larry Hamermesh and Paul Regan for their review of this article and their insightful
comments; Carol Perrupato for her indispensable secretarial assistance; Connie Sweeney for
her bluebook expertise; and Alan Gardner for his love and support while I was writing this
article. Any remaining errors or omissions are mine alone.
I H.R. 676, 108th Cong. (2004) (statement of Rep. John Conyers, Jr.), available at http://
www.house.gov/conyers/newshealthcare.htm.
2 IRS Official Sees "Situation in Chaos" as Nonprofits Assess Charity Obligations, DAILY
TAX REP. (BNA) Dec. 8, 2004, at G-10.
I The terms "tax-exempt organization" and "exempt organization" are used interchangeably
in this Article to refer to nonprofit organizations that qualify for, and have been granted, an
exemption from federal income tax pursuant to I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). In addition, any refer-
ence to "exemption" or "tax-exempt" status is intended to refer exclusively to such status
under federal income tax law and does not imply exemption under other federal tax laws, or
under state or local laws, unless otherwise indicated.
I See Terry Carter, Who Pays Hefty Hospital Tabs?, 91 ABA JOURNAL, Jan. 2005, at 14;
Ceci Connolly, Tax-Exempt Hospitals' Practices Challenged, WASH. POST, Jan. 29, 2005, at
Al.
5 See Connolly, supra note 4, at Al.
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uninsured and underinsured patients along with constantly increasing costs for
providing health care services, nonprofit hospitals are compelled to look for
alternative revenue sources to remain afloat and to sustain their charitable mis-
sion. In the last two decades, tax-exempt health care providers have found such
an alternative revenue source through participating in joint ventures with for-
profit entities or individuals (hereinafter, "for-profit participants").6
Hospitals and health care providers are not the only tax-exempt, charitable
organizations (hereinafter, collectively referred to as "exempt organizations") 7
whose role in society and charitable mission are subject to debate. 8 Exempt
organizations other than hospitals are similarly faced with a chronic problem-
finding new and consistent sources of revenue beyond the limited donation
pool, consisting of private and governmental donors, which will provide them
with the necessary resources to accomplish their charitable mission. Joint ven-
tures with for-profit participants are an increasingly alternative and viable reve-
nue source to fund their primary, charitable activities. For exempt health care
organizations, in addition to extra revenue, a joint venture may provide needed
capital, assist in recruiting or retaining necessary expertise, help pool the risk in
a new enterprise or medical procedure, and help provide a new medical service
or facility to an area in need.9 For exempt educational organizations, a joint
venture with private or governmental sponsors can ensure that the' organization
undertakes important research.' For other exempt charitable organizations, a
joint venture is the necessary vehicle to develop housing that benefits low-
income families and individuals while providing the development investors
with desired tax credits.1" In discussing the participation of exempt organiza-
tions in such joint ventures, this Article presupposes that such participation, in
most circumstances, yields an ultimate societal good because it necessarily pro-
vides an exempt organization the ability to continue its charitable activities,
resulting in a positive impact on the community as a whole.' 2
As the primary regulator of exempt organizations, the Internal Revenue
Service (hereinafter, the "IRS") initially approached joint ventures involving
for-profit participants with much skepticism and took a per se position that an
organization risked its very exemption if it participated in such a venture or
otherwise shared its net profits.13 After its defeat in a landmark court deci-
6 MICHAEL I. SANDERS, JOINT VENTURES INVOLVING TAx-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS § 1.1
and Preface to Supplement (2d ed. 2000 & Supp. 2005).
7 See supra note 3.
8 J. Christine Harris, NYU Conference Surveys Current Definition of Charity, 39 EXEMPT
ORG. TAX REV. 27 (2003).
9 SANDERS, supra note 6, § 1.3, at 5.
10 Id., § 1.4, at 6.
'1 Id., § 1.5, at 7.
12 See infra notes 49-50 and accompanying text with respect to the involvement of exempt
organizations in "commercial" enterprises; see also Jack E. Karns, Justifying the Nonprofit
Hospital Tax Exemption in a Competitive Market Environment, 13 WIDENER L.J. 383 (2004)
(addressing the continuing debate as to whether continuing tax exemption to nonprofit hospi-
tals is justified in light of arguably substantially similar services being provided by their
commercial, for-profit counterparts).
13 See infra notes 110-14 and accompanying text.
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sion, 14 the IRS abandoned its per se position and adopted a "two-prong test"
for analyzing whether an exempt organization's participation in a joint venture
with for-profit participants jeopardized its tax-exempt status. 5 This two-pro-
nged test eventually evolved into a facts-and-circumstances determination that
focused on whether the exempt organization retained sufficient "control" over
the joint venture activities, thereby ensuring that the organization's own
exempt, charitable purposes were furthered or accomplished through its partici-
pation in the joint venture and no more than incidental benefit, financial or
otherwise, was conferred on the for-profit participants.16 In response to the
increasing number of tax-exempt hospitals entering into "whole hospital" joint
ventures with for-profit participants (an arrangement in which the entire assets
and operations of the hospital are transferred to a newly-created entity in which
both the hospital and for-profit participants are joint owners),' 7 the IRS issued
Revenue Ruling 98-15, which officially established a standard of "control"
requiring the exempt organization to retain numerical control of the joint ven-
ture's governing board of directors.1 8 Again, the IRS saw the exempt organiza-
tion's control of the venture as crucial because it provided the organization with
an ability to ensure that its activities were exclusively in furtherance of its
exempt purposes and served as a safeguard against too much benefit, financial
or otherwise, being conferred on the for-profit participants.' 9
After the issuance of Revenue Ruling 98-15 and in subsequent case law
that interpreted and applied it, the issue that remained was whether courts
would equally apply the control standard enunciated in the ruling as to whole
hospital joint ventures to an exempt organization's participation in an "ancil-
lary" joint venture. Unlike a whole hospital joint venture, an ancillary venture
does not entail the contribution of all of an exempt organization's assets, but
rather only an insubstantial portion of the organization's assets. 2' Furthermore,
in contrast to a whole hospital joint venture where the exempt hospital's sole
activity after the venture is its interest in the venture itself, an exempt hospital
or other charitable organization that participates in an ancillary joint venture
continues the activities for which it was granted an exemption in addition to
participating in the venture. Accordingly, the application of the same control
standard to ancillary joint ventures is less necessary and overly intrusive. Nev-
ertheless, until recently, the IRS consistently applied the control standard of
Revenue Ruling 98-15 to ancillary joint ventures.2 1
14 Plumstead Theatre Soc'y v. Comm'r, 74 T.C. 1324 (1980), aff'd, 675 F.2d 244 (9th Cir.
1982). For a more complete discussion of the implications of Plumstead, see infra notes
115-19 and accompanying text.
15 Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,005 (June 28, 1983), 1983 IRS GCM LEXIS 56. For a more
complete discussion of the implications of this ruling, see infra notes 120-29.
16 Id.; see also SANDERS, supra note 6, § 4.2, at 120-21, and infra notes 142-74 and accom-
panying text.
17 See infra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
18 Rev. Rul. 98-15, 1998-1 C.B. 718; see also infra notes 150-52 and accompanying text.
19 THOMAS K. HYATT & BRUCE R. HOPKINS, LAW OF TAx-EXEMPT HEALTH CARE ORGANI-
ZATIONS § 22.11, at 386 (2d ed. 2001 & Supp. 2004).
20 See infra note 37 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 221-27, 237 and accompanying text.
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After much criticism and constant calls for guidance specific to ancillary
joint ventures, the IRS issued Revenue Ruling 2004-51 in mid-2004, which
specifically addresses an exempt organization's participation in an ancillary
joint venture.2 2 Although Revenue Ruling 2004-51 signifies indisputable pro-
gress in the IRS's views with respect to the proper federal income tax treatment
of ancillary joint ventures, the ruling stops short of directly addressing the real
questions and issues raised by ancillary joint ventures.23 In response to such
criticism by practitioners in the exempt organizations' sector, an IRS represen-
tative unofficially issued a poignant reminder-Revenue Ruling 98-15 is "still
on the books" and "Revenue Ruling 2004-51 does nothing to modify Revenue
Ruling 98-15. "24 In other words, the control standard enunciated in Revenue
Ruling 98-15 appears to be alive and well with respect to ancillary joint ven-
tures, continuing to raise questions as to when and how it may be applied.
This Article attempts to provide a more tenable alternative to the control
standard with respect to ancillary joint ventures. Implicit in this Article's pro-
posal is the following notion: exempt organizations better serve the general
public and more fully achieve their exempt purpose through their ability to
enter into ancillary joint ventures that are not subject to onerous restrictions like
the IRS's current control standard. As necessary background, Part II of this
Article provides both a statutory framework and an analysis of related case law
essential to understanding both the exemption from federal income tax and the
significant issues raised by an exempt organization's participation in a joint
venture with for-profit participants. In doing so, the Article tracks the evolu-
tion of the control standard and its application to ancillary joint ventures.
Although most of the cases and rulings addressing joint ventures have evolved
in the exempt hospital and health care setting, this Article and the proposal set
forth herein are intended to have broad application to ancillary joint ventures
involving exempt organizations with missions and activities other than health
care. Part III of the Article discusses and critiques two noteworthy proposals
that offer an alternative to the control standard. Finally, Part IV offers an alter-
native proposal that provides a two-prong approach to the proper federal
income tax treatment of an exempt organization's participation in an ancillary
joint venture. The alternative proposal suggests that the IRS already possesses
the necessary statutory and regulatory resources that, with certain suggested
modifications, will more appropriately determine ancillary joint ventures' fed-
eral income tax treatment without imposing an economically unrealistic and
overbearing control standard.
II. EVOLUTION OF CURRENT FEDERAL INCOME TAX LAW WITH RESPECT TO
EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS' PARTICIPATION IN JOINT VENTURES
In order to understand the exemption from federal income tax and the
corresponding issues raised by an exempt organization's participation in a joint
venture with for-profit participants, this Article first provides an explanation of
22 See infra note 266 and accompanying text.
23 See infra notes 278-80 and accompanying text.
24 See infra note 281 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 6:21
RELINQUISH CONTROL!
the statutory framework and an analysis of related case law, beginning with an
explanation of what is meant by a "joint venture."
A. Overview-What is a Joint Venture?
Although the term "joint venture" can be defined in many different ways,
one court has defined it as follows:
[A] joint venture contemplates an enterprise jointly undertaken; [that] it is an associa-
tion of such joint undertakers to carry out a single project for profit; [that] there must
be a community of interest in the performance of a common purpose, a proprietary
interest in the subject matter, a right to direct and govern the policy in connection
therewith, [and] duty, which may be altered by agreement, to share both in profit and
losses.
2 5
Joint ventures are typically conducted by their participants through a busi-
ness entity, usually a partnership,26 or more recently, a limited liability com-
pany 27 that combines the limited liability benefit of a corporation with the
beneficial federal income tax treatment accorded to partnerships. For federal
income tax purposes, a partnership (and a limited liability company that does
not elect otherwise) 28 is generally not taxed as an entity separate from its own-
ers,29 but rather is treated as a pass-through entity pursuant to which items of
income, gain, loss, deduction, and credit pass through to its owners and are
reported on their individual income tax returns.30 Although generally treated as
a partnership for federal income tax purposes,3" a joint venture is distinguished
from a partnership in that a joint venture "does not entail a continuing relation-
ship among the parties,"3 but rather reflects a single activity or undertaking by
the parties. As discussed in Part I of this Article, participation in joint ventures
presents exempt organizations with particular opportunities to further their
exempt purposes, diversify their revenue source, and obtain needed capital or
expertise in an increasingly competitive economic environment.
33
With respect to an exempt organization, a joint venture is typically catego-
rized as being either a "whole hospital" or "ancillary" joint venture. The whole
hospital joint venture, which is also referred to as a "whole entity" joint venture
25 Harlen E. Moore Charitable Trust v. United States, 812 F. Supp. 130, 132 (C.D. Il1.
1993), aff'd, 9 F.3d 623 (8th Cir. 1993) (citations omitted).
26 REVISED UNIF. P'SHip ACT § 202(a), 6 U.L.A. 92 (1997) (defining a partnership as an
"association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit").
27 SANDERS, supra note 6, §§ 1.2, 1.6. In fact, Rev. Rul. 98-15, 1998-1 C.B. 718 and the
primary IRS guidance on whole hospital joint ventures, involved two scenarios of joint ven-
tures in which the limited liability company was utilized as the joint venture entity. See infra
note 150 and accompanying text.
28 A limited liability company with two or more members may elect to be classified either
as a partnership or a corporation for federal income tax purposes. See Treas. Reg.
§ 301.7701-2(a), 3(c) (as amended in 2003).
29 I.R.C. § 701 (2004); Treas. Reg. § 1.701-1 (1956), 301.7701-3(b) (as amended in 2003).
30 SANDERS, supra note 6, § 1.2, at 2; see also I.R.C. § 702 (2004), Treas. Reg. § 1.702-1
(as amended in 2002).
3' I.R.C. §§ 761, 7701(a)(2) (2004); Treas. Reg. § 1.761-1(a) (as amended in 1997).
32 SANDERS, supra note 6, § 1.2, at 2.
33 See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
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in a non-health care context,34 emerged in the early 1990s due to the financial
and other needs of the health care industry. Specifically, the term describes
an arrangement in which the total assets and operations of a tax-exempt hospi-
tal are transferred to a joint venture entity, typically a limited liability company,
in which both the hospital and for-profit participants are joint owners, and
thereafter the hospital is operated as a for-profit entity. 36 An ancillary joint
venture is typically defined as one that does not involve the contribution of all
of an exempt organization's assets.37 Thus, the term ancillary can theoretically
encompass a wide range of joint ventures, including those where an exempt
organization contributes only an insubstantial portion of its total assets to the
joint venture or contributes a substantial portion of it assets, but not all of them.
This Article focuses specifically on the federal income tax treatment of exempt
organizations' participation in ancillary joint ventures.
B. Current Federal Income Tax Law-Statutory and Case Law
1. Overview of the Federal Income Tax Exemption Scheme
In order to discuss in detail the current state of federal income tax law with
respect to an exempt organization's participation in a joint venture with a for-
profit entity, it is necessary to be familiar with how an organization initially
obtains its exemption, including the various statutory and regulatory tests as
well as legal doctrines that govern both its organization and operation. Accord-
ingly, this Article provides a brief overview of the federal income tax exemp-
tion statute and the regulatory tests that must be satisfied before an exemption
can be granted. In addition, fundamental concepts such as the private inure-
ment prohibition, the private benefit doctrine, and the unrelated business
income tax are briefly reviewed. Each of these concepts serves to govern an
exempt organization's activities and ultimately preserve the organization's tax-
exempt status.
31 See Darryll K. Jones, Private Benefit and the Unanswered Questions From Redlands
Surgical Services, 29 EXEMPT ORG. TAX. REV. 433, 433 n.9 (2000).
31 See Rochelle Korman & Dahlia Balsam, Joint Ventures With For-Profits After Revenue
Ruling 98-15, 27 EXEMPT ORG. TAX. REV. 441, 445 (2000). See also Mary Jo Salins, et al.,
Whole Hospital Joint Ventures, MATERIALS FOR IRS EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS CONTINUING
PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION TECHNICAL INSTRUCTION PROGRAM FOR FY 1999, at 3, available
at http://www.irs.ustreas.gov/charities/article/0,,id=96421,00.html [hereinafter IRS CPE
MATERIALS] ("Whole hospital joint ventures gained a foothold when exempt hospital sys-
tems found a need to control their revenue base, expand patient coverage, and compete for
managed care and physician organization contracts due to major health care alliances form-
ing among providers.").
36 Id.; see also MARION R. FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 296
(2004).
17 HvAT-r & HOPKINS, supra note 19, Supp. § 22.11, at 74 n.107.1. The IRS actually places
these joint ventures into two categories, "hospital subsidiary joint ventures" (exempt organi-
zation uses a subsidiary to participate in a joint venture involving less than all of its assets)
and "hospital ancillary joint ventures" (exempt organization directly participates in the joint
venture involving less than all of its assets). Id.
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a. The Organizational and Operational Tests
Section 501(c)(3) 38 provides for the exemption from federal income tax of
nonprofit corporations and certain other entities "organized and operated exclu-
sively for religious, charitable, scientific .... or educational purposes .... no
part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private shareholder
or individual."39 Numerous administrative ruling issued by the IRS and appli-
cable regulations define the meaning of each exempt purpose listed in the stat-
ute (i.e., religious, charitable, educational, etc.). For instance, with respect to
the meaning of "charitable," the IRS has recognized that, among other activi-
ties, the promotion of health care constitutes a charitable purpose under Sec-
tion 501(c)(3), provided the organization satisfies the "community benefit
standard." 4  As a result, numerous nonprofit hospitals are tax-exempt
organizations.
As set forth in applicable regulations, the language of Section 501(c)(3)
establishes both an "organizational test" and an "operational test," and if an
organization seeks to qualify for exemption thereunder, it must not fail to meet
either test.4 ' The organizational test relates solely to the language used in the
organization's governing documents-its articles of incorporation (if a non-
profit corporation) or trust instrument (if a charitable trust). Under the test as
set forth in the regulations, an organization is organized exclusively for one or
more tax-exempt, charitable purposes only if its articles of organization: (i)
limit its purpose to one or more exempt purposes; and (ii) do not expressly
empower it to engage, otherwise than as insubstantial part of its activities, in
activities that in themselves do not further one or more exempt purposes.4 2
Accordingly, an organization that is empowered by its articles "to engage in
operating a restaurant" or "to engage in the operation of a social club" does not
meet this organizational test regardless of whether its articles state that it is
created for exempt purposes within the meaning of Section 501(c)(3). 43 The
organizational test also imposes requirements as to the distribution of the
organization's assets upon dissolution."
The operational test, which is referenced frequently throughout this Arti-
cle, is intended to ensure that the organization's resources and activities are
38 Unless otherwise indicated, all "Section" references are to the Internal Revenue Code of
1986, as amended.
" I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2004).
40 See Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117. The "community benefit standard" requires that
a hospital, in order to be exempt under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) must: (i) maintain an emergency
room that is "open to all persons" (i.e., no one requiring emergency care is denied treat-
ment); (ii) provide hospital care for all persons in the community able to pay the cost thereof
either directly or through third party reimbursement (including both private health insurance
or public programs such as Medicare); (iii) maintain an open medical staff, with members of
its active staff having the privilege of leasing available space in its medical building; and (iv)
ensure that control of the hospital rests with a community board of trustees comprised of
independent civic leaders. See also Rev. Rul. 83-157, 1983-2 C.B. 94.
41 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(a)(1) (as amended in 1990).
42 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(b)(1)(i) (as amended in 1990).
43 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(b)(l)(iii) (as amended in 1990).
44 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(4) (as amended in 1990) (requiring that the organization
either in its Articles or under governing state law, must explicitly dedicate its assets to one or
more exempt purposes in the event of dissolution).
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devoted primarily to its exempt purposes. The regulations break down the
operational test into two components commonly referred to as (i) the primary
purpose or activity test, and (ii) the private inurement prohibition.4 5 Under the
primary purpose or activity test, an organization will be regarded as "operated
exclusively" for one or more exempt purposes only if it "engages primarily in
activities which accomplish one or more of such exempt purposes in Section
501(c)(3)."4 6 An organization will not regarded as primarily furthering its
exempt purposes if "more than an insubstantial part of its activities is not in
furtherance of an exempt purpose. 4 7 Under the private inurement prohibition,
the regulations provide that an organization will not meet the operational test
"if its net earnings inure in whole or in part to the benefit of private sharehold-
ers or individuals. ' 48 This prohibition is discussed in greater detail below.
The major impact of the primary purpose test, based on the term "prima-
rily" utilized in the regulations, is that an organization exempt under Section
501(c)(3) may engage in an insubstantial amount of business activities unre-
lated to its exempt purpose without' risking loss of its exemption, but the net
income from any such business is potentially subject to the unrelated business
income tax under Section 511, as discussed below. 49 However, if the organiza-
tion's primary purpose is the operation of a trade or business, it likely will not
qualify for exemption.5 0 For instance, an organization will not be considered
as organized and operated for exempt purposes if its sole activity is the manu-
facture of pasta products even if all of its profits are to be distributed to a tax-
exempt educational institution. 5 1 Accordingly, the focus of the operational test
is on the actual purposes the organization advances or fulfills through its activi-
45 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1), (2) (as amended in 1990).
46 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1) (as amended in 1990) (emphasis added).
47 Id. (emphasis added).
4' Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(2) (as amended in 1990) (emphasis added).
49 I.R.C. § 511 (2004); see also infra notes 77-102 and accompanying text.
50 This is sometimes referred to as the "commerciality doctrine"-where the business or
commercial activity is not in furtherance of exempt purposes and is substantial in size and
scope. See BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS § 4.5(a) (8th ed. 2003
& Supp. 2004). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(e) (as amended in 1990), which
provides:
An organization may meet the requirements of section 501(c)(3) although it operates a trade or
business as a substantial part of its activities, if the operation of such trade or business is in
furtherance of the organization's exempt purpose or purposes and if the organization is not
organized or operated for the primary purpose of carrying on an unrelated trade or business, as
defined section 513.
See infra notes 83-89 and accompanying text for further discussion on the tax consequences
of an exempt organization's participation in unrelated trade or business activities. It is
important to note that any failure to meet the operational test cannot be rectified by referring
to language in the governing documents (i.e., articles of incorporation). HOPKINS, at
§ 4.5(a).
51 See C. F. Mueller Co. v. Comm'r, 14 T.C. 922, 931-932 (1950), rev'd 190 F.2d 120 (3d
Cir. 1951). The IRS and the Tax Court rejected the petitioner's position that it qualified as
an exempt organization under the "destination-of-income test." Id. The Tax Court reiterated
the statutory requirement that an organization be organized "exclusively" for one or more
exempt purposes and further stated:
One cannot say properly that a corporation was organized and operated exclusively for educa-
tional purposes where, as here, one of its important purposes was to conduct a large commercial
business for profit, competing with other similar corporations all subject to tax, and where the
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ties, not on its statement of purposes or the nature of its activities. 5 ' This focus
implicitly recognizes that an organization may conduct a trade or business
activity that is related to or furthers its exempt purposes, thereby maintaining
its exempt status under Section 501(c)(3).53 This distinction between activities
and purpose is an important aspect of the operational test and one that can be
overlooked by both the IRS and the courts.54 Such distinction will be discussed
in greater detail below in the context of both the private benefit doctrine and the
unrelated business income tax.
b. Private Inurement and Private Benefit
The private inurement prohibition and the private benefit doctrine are fun-
damental components of an organization's tax-exempt status under Sec-
tion 501(c)(3) and are, therefore, a primary focus of the IRS in scrutinizing
joint ventures between an exempt organization and an individual or for-profit
entity." These doctrines are often incorrectly used interchangeably.5 6 How-
ever, fundamental differences between the two concepts exist, the importance
of which will be further revealed in Part III of this Article.
As previously stated, an organization exempt under Section 501(c)(3)
must be organized and operated in a manner that effectively prevents it from
distributing its net earnings to "private shareholders or individuals." 8 The pro-
hibition is absolute-any amount of inurement is impermissible.59 As stated
by the IRS Chief Counsel, "[i]nurement is likely to arise where the financial
benefit represents a transfer of the [exempt] organization's financial resources
to an individual solely by virtue of the individual's relationship with the organi-
zation, and without regard to accomplishing exempt purposes."60 The term
"private shareholder or individual" is defined as "persons having a personal and
private interest in the activities of the organization."61 The key to the applica-
tion of this prohibition is that the transaction at issue must involve such a per-
son, commonly referred to as an "insider." Typically, an insider is an officer,
operation of that business is not merely incidental to the conduct by the same corporation of any
other overshadowing exempt activity.
14 T.C. at 931-32. The Third Circuit reversed the Tax Court finding that the destination-of-
income test was rooted in public policy, but noted that its interpretation was no longer rele-
vant due to the enactment of the UBIT that was effective after December 31, 1950. 190 F.2d
at 120.
52 HOPKINS, supra note 50, § 4.5(a), at 82.
51 Id. at 83.
54 Id. at 84.
55 SANDERS, supra note 6, § 5.1(a), at 181.
56 Distinguishing Between Private Benefit and Inurement, TAX-EXEMPT ADVISOR (CCH),
Dec. 11, 2000, at 9 [hereinafter TAX-EXEMPT ADVISOR].
51 See infra notes 302-24 and accompanying text for further discussion on the expansion of
the private benefit doctrine in the joint venture context.
18 See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
59 SANDERS, supra note 6, § 5.1(b), at 183.
60 I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 38,459 (July 31, 1980), available at 1980 IRS GCM LEXIS 71.
61 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(a)-l(c) (as amended in 1982). I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862
(Dec. 2, 1991), available at 1991 IRS GCM LEXIS 39 (describing the term as encompassing
"persons who, because of their particular relationship with an organization, have an opportu-
nity to control or influence its activities").
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director, member, or other person in a position to assert influence or control
over the organization's operations and activities.62 For instance, at one time,
the IRS's position was that all physicians were per se insiders with respect to
the tax-exempt hospital where they were on staff.63 This position was based on
the reciprocal economic dependency between the two-the physicians have a
personal interest in the hospital's operations and thus are able to influence or
control the hospital through referrals and patient treatment.
64
The private inurement doctrine does not prohibit transactions between an
exempt organization and an insider, but rather requires that any such transac-
tion be reviewed for reasonableness.65 Typically, private inurement is found to
exist in transactions with insiders involving the payment of excessive compen-
sation, the purchase or sale of assets on a non-fair-market-value basis, and the
use of the exempt organization's assets to pay an insider's personal expenses.6 6
Prior to the enactment of the intermediate sanction rules under Section 4958, as
discussed in greater detail in Part IV of this Article, the IRS customarily
revoked the exemption of organizations determined to have violated the private
inurement prohibition.67
As with the existence of any private inurement, an organization cannot be
exempt under Section 501(c)(3) if it fails to satisfy the private benefit doctrine.
The doctrine originates not from the statute itself but from the regulations,
which state that an organization is not organized or operated exclusively for
one or more exempt purposes "unless it serves a public rather than a private
interest. ' 68 Accordingly, the doctrine is a "derivative of the operational test"-
i.e., it is inherent in the operational test that an exempt organization must oper-
ate primarily for exempt purposes and not for private benefit. 69 The scope of
the private benefit doctrine is extremely broad and looks to all of the activities
of an organization in determining whether the organization primarily operates
for public rather than private benefit. Thus, in contrast to the private inurement
prohibition, an incidental amount of private benefit can occur without jeopard-
62 SANDERS, supra note 6, § 5.1(b), at 183. See also infra notes 395-99 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the appellate decision in United Cancer Council, Inc. v. Comm'r
which affected the "insider" definition. 165 F.3d 1173 (7th Cir. 1999), rev'g and remanding
109 T.C. 326 (1997).
63 See I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862 (Dec. 2, 1991), available at 1991 IRS GCM LEXIS
39.
6 TAX-EXEMPT ADVISOR, supra note 56, at 9. The IRS now takes the position that whether
a physician is an insider depends on a more function?1, facts-and-circumstances analysis
which looks to the "reality of control" rather than the individual's place in the organization's
structure. See Lawrence M. Brauer & Charles F. Kaiser III, Physician Incentive Compensa-
tion, IRS CPE MATERIALS FOR FY 2000, at 26, http://www.irs.ustreas.gov/pub/irs-tege/
eotopicc00.pdf.
65 HYATT & HOPKINS, supra note 19, § 4.1, at 57.
66 Celia Roady, Intermediate Sanctions, 884 TAX MGMT. ESTS., GiFrs, & TRS. J. (BNA)
(2004).
67 Id. The concept of an "insider" and transactions that violate the private inurement prohi-
bition are directly imported into the definitions of a "disqualified person" and "excess bene-
fit transaction" under the intermediate sanction rules. However, it is not yet clear what effect
these statutory terms will have on private inurement and the common law concept of an
insider. See infra note 364 and accompanying text.
68 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(d)(1)(ii) (as amended in 1990) (emphasis added).
69 HOPKINS, supra note 50, § 19.10, at 522.
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izing an organization's exemption. 70 The result is a balancing test whereby the
IRS determines whether a particular private benefit is outweighed by the public
benefit conferred on the community as a whole.7
In addition, where the private inurement prohibition only applies if undue
benefit is conferred to an insider, the private benefit doctrine applies if an
impermissible benefit is being conferred on unrelated third parties or "disinter-
ested persons" as well. 72 Accordingly, a situation can exist in which private
benefit may exist without any private inurement.73 For example, if an exempt
organization executes a contract with a fundraising consultant who is not an
officer or board member of the organization and who retains ninety percent of
any contributions received as a result of his fundraising efforts, the private ben-
efit doctrine likely applies because the organization is operating more for pri-
vate rather than public interests. Hovever, because the fundraiser is not a
board member or officer of the organization, he will not be considered an
insider and, therefore, the private inurement prohibition does not apply.7 1 It is
this broad scope of the private benefit doctrine, which encompasses and exam-
ines all of an organization's activities (i.e., exempt activities, transactions with
insiders and/or with unrelated disinterested persons), that has resulted in an
aggressive expansion and application of the doctrine by the IRS in the context
of joint ventures. The expansion of the private benefit doctrine in the context
of joint ventures will be discussed in greater detail in Part III of this Article.75
It is important to note that although private inurement and private benefit
are distinct, some see the development of the intermediate sanctions rules under
Section 4958, discussed in Part IV of this Article, as affecting both doctrines
because "their concepts are interrelated" and their bodies of law are "similar to
or parallel to the intermediate sanctions concepts."76
c. Unrelated Business Income Tax
7 7
The concept of an unrelated trade or business activity carried on by an
exempt organization originates from the operational test; specifically, the pri-
mary purpose component of the test, as discussed above.78 Under this test, an
exempt organization may engage in trade or business activities that are unre-
lated to its exempt purposes provided the activities are only incidental to, or
70 Id. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(c)(l) (as amended in 1990). See also Better Bus. Bureau
of D.C. Inc. v. United States, 326 U.S. 279, 283 (1945) (holding that "[a] substantial non-
educational purpose will disqualify an organization from tax exemption despite the number
or importance of its exempt purposes.") (emphasis added).
11 TAx-EXEMPT ADVISOR, supra note 56, at 9.
72 Id.
13 For additional discussion on the distinction between the private inurement prohibition and
the private benefit doctrine, see HOPKINS, supra note 50, § 19.10, and SANDERS, supra note
6, § 5.1(c).
71 See infra notes 395-98 and accompanying text.
71 See infra notes 302-24 and accompanying text.
76 See SANDERS, supra note 6, § 5.2, at 189.
77 A treatise can be written on the unrelated business income tax ("UBIT") and the
numerous issues and nuances which now saturate this area of tax-exempt law. However, the
discussion herein is only intended to provide an overview so that later references to the
UBIT and its effect on joint ventures can be readily grasped and understood.
78 See supra notes 50-54 and accompanying text.
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less than a substantial part of, its exempt purpose activities. If an organiza-
tion's primary purpose is the operation of a trade or business unrelated to its
exempt purposes it will not qualify for exemption under Section 501(c)(3)
because, in such instances, the organization is essentially equivalent to a for-
profit business entity.7 9 As a consequence, the "unrelated business income tax"
(hereinafter referred to as the "UBIT") imposed under Section 511 targets only
income that an exempt organization receives from its trade or business activi-
ties that are unrelated to, and represent an insubstantial part of, its overall
exempt purposes.
The primary objective of the UBIT is to "eliminate a source of unfair
competition" with for-profit businesses, by subjecting the unrelated business
activities of exempt organizations to the same tax consequences as the non-
exempt business endeavors with which they compete.8 ° Furthermore, it
ensures that an exempt organization cannot "commercially exploit its exempt
status for the purpose of unfairly competing with taxpaying organizations."'"
Accordingly, the UBIT imposes the same tax rates as those imposed on the
income of for-profit corporations.82
The UBIT is specifically imposed on "unrelated business income," statuto-
rily defined as income from an "unrelated trade or business" which is "regu-
larly carried on."' 83 An unrelated trade or business is defined as a trade or
business activity that is not "substantially related" to the exempt organization's
exercise or performance of its exempt purpose or function.84 To be considered
"related" to an organization's exempt purposes or function, the conduct of the
business activities must have a "causal relationship to the achievement of
exempt purposes (other than through the production of income)." S5 Such
causal relationship is "substantial" if "the production or distribution of the
goods or the performance of the services from which the gross income is
derived . . . contribute[s] importantly to the accomplishment of those pur-
poses."'86 Therefore, the relationship between the business activity that gener-
ates the income in issue and the accomplishment of the organization's exempt
7 See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
80 Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(b) (as amended in 1983).
81 HoPKINS, supra note 50, § 26.1 (citing S. REP. No. 94-938, 601 (1976)).
82 See I.R.C. § 511(a)(1) (2004), referring to I.R.C. § 11 (2004).
83 I.R.C. § 512(a)(1) (2004). The term "trade or business" is defined to include "any activ-
ity which is carried on for the production of income from the sale of goods or the perform-
ance of services." I.R.C. § 513(c) (2004). Such trade or business activities of an exempt
organization are considered as "regularly carried on" if they "manifest a frequency and con-
tinuity, and are pursued in a manner, generally similar to comparable commercial activities
of nonexempt organizations." Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(c)(1) (as amended in 1983). I.R.C.
512(b) (2004) provides certain exceptions to the definition of unrelated business income
including dividends, interest, rents, royalties, and gain on sales of non-inventory property,
unless any of these items (except dividends) originate from a controlled subsidiary or debt-
financed property.
84 I.R.C. § 513(a) (2004).
85 Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(d)(2) (as amended in 1983).
86 Id. In determining whether activities "contribute importantly" to the accomplishment of
an exempt purpose, "the size and extent of the activities involved must be considered in
relation to the nature and extent of the exempt function which they purport to serve." Treas.
Reg. § 1.513-1(d)(3) (as amended in 1983).
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purposes must necessarily be examined.87 For instance, organizations whose
primary activities consist of operating a trade or business that furthers their
exempt purposes or functions are museums, hospitals, social service agencies,
colleges and universities.88
The regulations provide as an example an organization exempt under Sec-
tion 501(c)(3) that operates a school for training children in the performing arts,
such as acting, singing, and dancing. The organization is not subject to UBIT
on the income it derives from admissions charged at student performances
because the performances contribute importantly to the accomplishment of its
exempt, educational purposes. 89 Likewise, a tax-exempt hospital's participa-
tion in a joint venture with physicians to operate an ambulatory surgical center
or medical imaging facility can be substantially related to, and thereby further,
its exempt purpose of promoting the health of the community.90 Accordingly,
based on the above explanation, an exempt organization must necessarily seg-
regate its trade or business activities into two categories in order to determine
UBIT applicability: (i) Those activities that are unrelated to its exempt pur-
poses and represent only an insubstantial portion of its overall activities, the
income from which is subject to the UBIT; and (ii) those activities that are
substantially related to its exempt purpose or function and, thus, not subject to
the UBIT.9 1
For exempt organizations that engage in unrelated business activities and
pay the UBIT on the income from those activities, a fundamental issue arises-
at what level of activity or amount of income will an exempt organization's
unrelated business activities be considered more than "insubstantial," thereby
jeopardizing its tax-exempt status? 92 Organizations have traditionally failed to
qualify for exemption if a substantial portion of their income is from unrelated
activities.93 For instance, the IRS has held that an organization's exemption
may be denied or revoked if it earns greater than fifty percent of its annual
receipts from unrelated business activities. 94 Although there is no bright-line
rule or percentage limitation, the common measure of substantiality or lack
thereof has been in terms of percentage of time or expenditures. 95 For exam-
ple, an organization was denied tax-exempt status because it received approxi-
mately one-third of its revenues from unrelated business activities.9 6 However,
there has not been consistent application of any one standard by the IRS or the
87 HOPKINS, supra note 50, § 26.4, at 763.
88 FRANCES R. HILL & DOUGLAS M. MANCINO, TAXATION OF EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS
21.03[l ][a] (2003).
89 Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(d)(4), Ex. 1 (as amended in 1983).
90 See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2001-18-054 (Feb. 7, 2001).
91 HOPKINS, supra note 50, § 26.1, at 744.
92 See HILL & MANCINO, supra note 88, 21.03[l][a].
93 HOPKINS, supra note 50, § 26.1, at 745 citing People's Educ. Camp Soc'y, Inc. v.
Comm'r, 331 F.2d 923 (2d Cir. 1964); Indiana Retail Hardware Ass'n v. United States, 366
F.2d 998 (Ct. Cl. 1966); Rev. Rul. 69-220, 1969-1 C.B. 154.
94 HOPKINS, supra note 50, § 26.1, at 745; see also I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,108 (Dec.
23, 1982), available at 1983 IRS GCM LEXIS 147.
95 HOPKINS, supra note 50, § 26.1, at 745.
96 Id.; see Orange County Agric. Soc'y, Inc. v. Comm'r, 893 F.2d 529 2d Cir. 1990), aff'g
55 T.C.M. 1602 (1988).
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courts in determining whether an organization's unrelated business activities
are substantial or not.
9 7
Periodically, the IRS will apply a "commensurate in scope" test, first
articulated in a 1964 revenue ruling, which compares the extent of an exempt
organization's financial resources to its exempt activities or efforts. 98 Under
this test, a substantial portion of an exempt organization's total revenues may
flow from unrelated business activities, but not affect its tax-exempt status if a
significant amount of the organization's time and efforts are spent on its
exempt functions or activities.99 However, the ruling failed to provide any
quantitative measure or standard for determining whether an organization's
exempt activities would be "commensurate in scope" with its financial
resources."° Nevertheless, in subsequent technical advice, the IRS concluded
that an organization organized and operated for charitable purposes that earned
ninety-eight percent of its income from unrelated business activities was still
exempt under Section 501(c)(3) because greater than forty percent of its time
was expended on exempt programs or activities.'O°
Although a significant amount of legal scholarship and IRS administrative
guidance have focused on the UBIT and whether too much unrelated business
activity can jeopardize an organization's tax-exempt status, the breadth of the
topic is beyond the scope of this Article.'0 2 The important point to take away
from this discussion is that there is no clearly articulated standard that defini-
tively resolves the issue of when an organization engages in too "substantial"
an amount of unrelated business activity and, as a result, threatens the denial or
" HoPKINS, supra note 50, § 26.1, at 745; I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 2000-21-056 (May 25,
2000) (there is no "quantitative limitation" on the amount of unrelated business in which an
exempt organization may engage), and Nationalist Movement v. Comm'r, 102 T.C. 558, 589
(1994), aff'd, 37 F.3d 216 (5th Cir. 1994) ("[w]hether an activity is substantial is a facts-and-
circumstances inquiry not always dependent on time or expenditure percentages").
98 Rev. Rul. 64-182, 1964-1 C.B. 186. In the revenue ruling, the organization owned and
operated a commercial office building, the rental income from which comprised one hundred
percent of the organization's income. Although the income was from an unrelated business
activity, the IRS concluded that the organization was exempt under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2004)
because its primary exempt function or activity-making grants to other exempt, charitable
organizations-was "commensurate in scope with its financial resources." Id.
99 HOPKINS, supra note 50, § 26.1, at 745.
0 HILL & MANCINO, supra note 88, 21.03[1][a].
'0' I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 97-11-003 (Nov. 8, 1995). The organization received ninety-
eight percent of its revenue from bingo games. Although the organization represented that it
dedicated more than fifty percent of its time and resources to the bingo games, the IRS
nevertheless dismissed any "commensurate" issue by relying on the fact that the organization
had expended greater than forty percent of its time and resources to the assistance of devel-
opmentally disabled children over the past thirty years. Id. Accordingly, the IRS concluded
that the commensurate-in-scope test was not applicable because the organization had a "sub-
stantial charitable program in addition to its fundraising activities." Id.
102 For an in-depth discussion of UBIT and tax-exempt status, see John D. Colombo, Regu-
lating Commercial Activity by Exempt Charities: Resurrecting the Commensurate-in-Scope
Doctrine, 33 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 341 (2003); see also John D. Colombo, Commercial
Activity and Charitable Tax Exemption, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 487 (2002).
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revocation of its tax-exempt status.' 0 3 The relevance and importance of this
point is further illuminated in Part III of this Article.
2. Exempt Organizations as Passive Participants In Joint Ventures
Involving For-Profit Participants
As previously discussed, several types of entities can be used to effect a
joint venture between an exempt organization and for-profit participants, the
most common of which are general partnerships, limited partnerships, and lim-
ited liability companies.l°4 The federal income tax consequences to the exempt
organization depend primarily on whether it is an "active" or "passive" partici-
pant in the joint venture. Historically, an exempt organization's "active" par-
ticipation in a joint venture (i.e., a partner in a general partnership, a general
partner in a limited partnership, or a member in a limited liability company' °5)
with for-profit participants has invited intense IRS scrutiny, with possible loss
of its tax-exempt status. 10 6 Exempt organizations can also participate as lim-
ited partners in joint ventures, commonly referred to as "passive investors,"
where they are only liable for their investment in the entity and do not generally
participate in the management of the venture. As a "passive" participant in a
joint venture, the exempt organization's typical federal income tax consequence
is whether the income it receives from the venture is subject to the UBIT.10 7
This distinction is important as this Article focuses exclusively on the "active,"
as opposed to the "passive," participation of exempt organizations in joint ven-
tures with for-profit participants. 10 8
3. Exempt Organizations as Active Participants In Joint Ventures
Involving For-Profit Participants
a. Evolution of the Two-Prong Test
Prior to the United States Tax Court's decision in Plumstead Theatre Soci-
ety v. Commissioner,'°9 discussed below, an organization exempt under Sec-
tion 501(c)(3) ceased to qualify as such if it participated in a partnership or
other type of joint venture entity (i.e., limited partnership, limited liability com-
103 See FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 36, at 299 ("[T]he Internal Revenue Code is unclear as
to whether there is a limit to the amount of commercial activity, both related and unrelated,
beyond which an organization will not be entitled to tax exemption.").
'o4 See supra notes 26-32 and accompanying text.
105 An exempt organization's participation in a joint venture formed as a limited liability
company does raise the issue as to whether it may invest or participate as a "non-managing
member," analogous to the "passive investor" role of a limited partner in a limited partner-
ship, which typically results in reduced IRS scrutiny and only possible UBIT consequences.
See infra note 107 and accompanying text. Because all members of an LLC have a right to
participate in its management, it is unclear whether such passive participation will be
acknowledged by the IRS. See SANDERS, supra note 6, § 1.8 n.81, and § 4.3 n.194.
106 Korman & Balsam, supra note 35.
107 SANDERS, supra note 6, § 1.8, at 11, citing Treas. Reg. § 1.512(c)-I (1958).
108 Furthermore, this Article does not address an exempt organization's participation in a
joint venture, ancillary or whole entity, with one or more other exempt organizations.
'19 Plumstead Theatre Soc'y v. Comm'r, 74 T.C. 1324 (1980), aff'd, 675 F.2d 244 (9th Cir.
1982).
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pany) or if it otherwise shared its net profits. '1° This "per se position"' " taken
by the IRS was exemplified in General Counsel Memorandum ("GCM")
36,293,' 12 wherein the exempt organization, a corporation organized to provide
low- and moderate-income housing on a nondiscriminatory basis, planned to
form a limited partnership that would own and rent the housing. The exempt
organization would serve as the general partner of the limited partnership while
private investors, who supplied the necessary capital for the venture, would be
limited partners. The IRS Chief Counsel concluded that the limited partnership
was nothing more than a vehicle for the exempt organization to share the net
profits of an income-producing venture with private individuals, thereby mak-
ing the venture inherently incompatible with the operational test of Section
501(c)(3).'1 3 The Chief Counsel stated:
By agreeing to serve as the general partner of the proposed housing project, the Cor-
poration [exempt organization] would take on an obligation to further the private
financial interests of the limited partners .... [T]he Corporation's assumption of a
duty to promote such interests in its capacity as general partner would necessarily
create a conflict of interest that is legally incompatible with its being operated exclu-
sively for charitable purposes.
1 14
The IRS's per se position on the participation of exempt organizations in
joint ventures with for-profit participants began to erode with the Tax Court's
landmark decision in Plumstead Theatre Society v. Commissioner. 115 In Plum-
stead, a California nonprofit corporation, exempt from federal income tax
under Section 501(c)(3) (the "Society"), was created to promote and encourage
the understanding of, and public interest in, the theater and the arts. 1' 16 The
Society entered into an agreement with the John F. Kennedy Center for the
Performing Arts in Washington, D.C., also an exempt organization, to co-pro-
duce a play starring the Society's president, Henry Fonda. Pursuant to their
agreement, the Society and the Kennedy Center each provided one-half of the
production costs and shared equally in profits and losses." 7
Prior to the premiere of the co-produced play, the Society experienced
difficulty raising its share of the production costs. Accordingly, it entered into
a limited partnership in which it served as a general partner, the limited partners
of which were two individuals and a for-profit corporation. Pursuant to the
110 SANDERS, supra note 6, § 4.2, at 120.
111 Id.
112 I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 36,293 (May 30, 1975), available at 1975 IRS GCM LEXIS
215; see also I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,259 (Sept. 19, 1977), available at 1977 IRS GCM
LEXIS 372.
13 See I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 36,293. The memorandum specifically states that, "[bly
agreeing to serve as the general partner of the proposed housing project, the Corporation
[exempt organization] would take on an obligation to further the private financial interests of
the limited partners." Id.
14 Id. The GCM further states that "the service of private interests by means of any
arrangement involving such a conflict of interest would also preclude any given organization
of that kind from being treated as one 'operated exclusively for the promotion of social
welfare'" within the meaning of I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) (2004). Id.
"1 Plumstead Theatre Soc'y v. Comm'r, 74 T.C. 1324, 1324 (1980), aft'd, 675 F.2d 244
(9th Cir. 1982).
116 Id. at 1325.
117 Id. at 1327.
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limited partnership agreement, the Society contributed its contractual rights
under its agreement with the Kennedy Center and the limited partners contrib-
uted capital in exchange for a sixty-three and one-half percent share in any
profits or losses resulting from the production of the play.'18
In determining whether the Society continued to satisfy the operational
test under Section 501(c)(3) after its participation in the limited partnership, the
Tax Court rejected the IRS's contention that the Society had a substantial com-
mercial purpose due to such participation and concluded that the Society's obli-
gations under the limited partnership agreement were not incompatible with its
tax-exempt status for the following reasons: (i) The Society's sale of its rights
in the Kennedy Center agreement was achieved through an arm's-length trans-
action for a reasonable price; (ii) the Society was not obligated to return the
limited partners' capital contributions from its own funds; (iii) the limited part-
nership had no interest in, nor any control over the activities of, the Society;
and (iv) none of the limited partners were officers or directors of the Society." 9
As a result of the Plumstead decision, the IRS abandoned its per se posi-
tion that an exempt organization's participation as a general partner in a joint
venture adversely affected its tax-exempt status, 120 and adopted a "two-prong
test" for analyzing whether such participation jeopardized tax-exempt status.' 2'
In GCM 39,005, the exempt organization was one of several general partners in
a limited partnership formed to construct, own, and operate a living facility for
low-income elderly and handicapped individuals. 122 In determining whether
the organization's tax-exempt status was jeopardized by virtue of its participa-
tion in the limited partnership, the IRS Chief Counsel concluded that such par-
ticipation did not jeopardize the organization's tax exemption because its
participation in the joint venture furthered its exempt purposes. In addition, the
IRS determined that the structure of the partnership agreement, together with
federally-imposed restrictions, sufficiently ensured that its partnership obliga-
tions would not conflict with its exempt purposes.
In reaching its conclusion in GCM 39,005, the IRS Chief Counsel enunci-
ated a two-part standard for analyzing an exempt organization's participation in
a joint venture: (i) Whether the exempt organization's participation in the joint
venture serves or furthers its exempt purpose (sometimes referred to as the
"charitable purpose test"12 3); and (ii) whether the partnership agreement per-
mits the organization to operate exclusively for exempt purposes and results in
not more than incidental private benefit to the for-profit, limited partners
(sometimes referred to as the "private benefit test" 2 4 ). 12 5 The first prong of
the test is, in essence, an extension of the operational test under Sec-
tion 501(c)(3)-taking into consideration the exempt organization's participa-
118 Id. at 1328.
''9 Id. at 1333-34.
120 SANDERS, supra note 6, § 4.2, at 122.
121 See I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,005 (June 28, 1983), available at 1983 IRS GCM
LEXIS 56; see also I.R.S.Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,732 (May 27, 1988), available at 1988 IRS
GCM LEXIS 44.
122 I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,005 (June 28, 1983).
123 Korman & Balsam, supra note 35, at 442.
124 Id.
125 Salins, et al., supra note 35, at 2.
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tion in the joint venture and whether the organization is still operated
"exclusively" (or "primarily" pursuant to the regulations' 26) for its exempt pur-
poses. 127  Even if a joint venture arrangement furthers an organization's
exempt purposes, the second prong of the test focuses the inquiry on the poten-
tial conflicts that invariably arise between such exempt purposes and the lim-
ited partnership arrangement. 12 8 Accordingly, while identifying the statutory
and other obligations of a general partner, the IRS further acknowledges in the
GCM that a partnership agreement may be structured to avoid any such
conflicts. 2 9
Subsequent general counsel memoranda further clarified and expanded the
two-prong test enunciated in GCM 39,005. For instance, in GCM 39,546,130
the IRS Chief Counsel concluded that an exempt organization, acting as the
sole general partner, could fulfill its fiduciary duty of profit maximization to
the limited partners while concurrently satisfying the constraints of the Sec-
tion 501(c)(3) operational test.13 1 In addition, the IRS acknowledged that a
126 See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
127 See SANDERS, supra note 6, § 4.2, at 125; Better Bus. Bureau v. United States, 326 U.S.
279, 283 (1945) (finding that a single substantial non-exempt purpose can obliterate an
organization's tax exemption, notwithstanding evidence of other charitable or exempt
purposes).
128 SANDERS, supra note 6, § 4.2, at 124. As explained by Sanders, such conflicts can arise
because of certain statutory obligations and/or obligations arising out of the partnership
agreement that are imposed on the exempt organization as a general partner (i.e., assumption
of liabilities by the general partner, thereby subjecting its personal assets-potential risk for
satisfying partnership debts; profit motive of limited partners). Id. However, as he dis-
cusses, the partnership agreement can be structured to prevent certain conflicts of interest
from arising. Id. See also supra note 114 and accompanying text.
129 Korman & Balsam, supra note 35, at 442-43. The authors note that, in subsequent
rulings and guidance, the IRS examines other protections available to an exempt general
partner in joint ventures: (i) allocations based on capital contributions and assumed risks,
I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,732 (May 27, 1988), available at 1988 IRS GCM LEXIS 44;
(ii) no special allocations of income, loss or deductions to any partner, id.; (iii) services and
property provided or contributed to the partnership must be at fair market value, id.; (iv)
capital contributions by limited partners must be substantial, I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem.
39,862 (Nov. 21, 1991), available at 1991 IRS GCM LEXIS 39; and (v) reasonable compen-
sation to all officers, directors and partners of a joint venture, Plumstead Theatre Society v.
Comm'r, 74 T.C. 1324, 1333 (1980); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 89-17-055 (Jan. 3, 1989).
130 I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,546 (Aug. 25, 1986), available at 1986 IRS GCM LEXIS
83.
131 Id. The GCM specifically states, "Although there is likely to be tension in any arrange-
ment in which an exempt organization has responsibilities to carry on a profit-making activ-
ity with non-exempt participants, we believe that the case law and our administrative
practice allow exempt organizations to be general partners. Of course, it is a highly factual
area and each case must be carefully scrutinized." Id. See also I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem.
39,732, which addresses three tax-exempt hospitals participating as general partners in joint
ventures with for-profit entities to provide certain health care services such as physical ther-
apy, ambulatory surgery and magnetic resonance imaging. The IRS Chief Counsel reached a
favorable conclusion as to such joint ventures, stating that such conclusion is consistent with
its previously-announced position in I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,005 (June 28, 1983), avail-
able at 1983 IRS GCM LEXIS 56. Further, the Chief Counsel affirmed such position by
stating that "there is nothing per se objectionable with an exempt organization entering into a
limited partnership where it either lacks or does not wish to expend all of the funds necessary
to build or purchase a facility which will further its exempt purposes." I.R.S. Gen. Couns.
Mem. 39,546 further states that the exempt organization is not required to establish that the
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tax-exempt general partner could not totally eliminate its liability exposure for
partnership debts, an obligation typically imposed by state partnership law and
a potential conflict with its exempt purpose.132 The IRS stated that, "although
the exposure of the general partner may be limited through insurance, indem-
nity agreements, or the nature of the activities carried on by the partnership, we
doubt that it can be eliminated."' 3 3 More importantly, as stated by one com-
mentator, GCM 39546 "is significant because it does much to resolve a funda-
mental problem arising in joint ventures, i.e., that the two or more participants
in it may have very different, but nonetheless compatible reasons for forming
the joint venture, one to further its exempt purpose and the other to obtain a fair
return on the investment."'' 34
The principles inherent in the two-prong test of GCM 39,005 were later
applied, although not explicitly, in Housing Pioneers v. Commissioner.'35 In
Housing Pioneers, the Tax Court upheld the IRS's determination that a Califor-
nia nonprofit corporation, whose stated purpose was "to provide innovative and
affordable housing for low income people, handicapped persons, and pre-and
post-incarcerated persons," did not qualify for exemption under Sec-
tion 501(c)(3) because its primary activity-serving as co-general partner in
for-profit limited partnerships that owned and managed low-income housing
projects-constituted a substantial non-exempt purpose. 36 As a consequence,
the organization was found to primarily serve private rather than public
interests. 137
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals concurred with the Tax Court's find-
ing that the nonprofit entered into these partnerships as a one percent co-gen-
eral partner for the primary purpose of availing all of the partners, both general
and limited, of the available federal and California state tax benefits associated
with such partnerships' low-income housing activities.' 38 Under the manage-
ment agreement executed as to each limited partnership, the nonprofit's author-
ity as a general partner is "narrowly circumscribed," with no management
facility could not have been built and operated without its participation in a limited
partnership.
132 I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,546 (stating "Normally, under state law, the general partner
will have unlimited liability for partnership debts, other than those that are nonrecourse.").
See also supra note 128 and accompanying text.
133 I.R.S. Gen Couns. Mem. 39,546.
134 HILL & MANCINO, supra note 88, 29.04[2], at 29-14.
"I Housing Pioneers v. Comm'r, 65 T.C.M. (RIA) 2191, aff'd, 49 F.3d 1395 (9th Cir.),
amended, 58 F.3d 401 (9th Cir. 1995). I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,005 is not explicitly
mentioned in either the Tax Court's or the Ninth Circuit's opinions. However, the two-step
analysis of I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,005 is implicit in the conclusions reached.
136 Housing Pioneers, 65 T.C.M. at 2191.
13' Housing Pioneers v. Comm'r, 58 F.3d 401, 402 (citing Better Bus. Bureau v. United
States, 326 U.S. 279, 283 (1945)). See supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the "private benefit doctrine."
138 Housing Pioneers, 58 F.3d at 404. Specifically, the limited partnership arrangement
permitted such partnerships to qualify for low-income housing tax credits under Section 42
and/or California property tax reduction (§ 214(g) of the California Revenue and Taxation
Code), a benefit that inured in part to the nonprofit corporation. See SANDERS, supra note 6,
§ 4.2, at 133-34 for a more detailed discussion.
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responsibilities. 139 As to one of these agreements, the nonprofit acknowledged
to the IRS that it was not negotiated at arm's length due to the interrelationships
between members of the nonprofit's board and limited partners in the partner-
ship. 4 ° Although the Tax Court and the Ninth Circuit did not explicitly apply
the two-prong test of GCM 39,005, which has been criticized,' 4' their conclu-
sion nevertheless is consistent with the application of such test. The courts
found that: (i) The nonprofit's participation in the limited partnerships did not
further its exempt purpose (the first prong or charitable purpose test); and (ii)
the limited partnership arrangement failed to protect or "insulate" the nonprofit
from conflicts between its obligations as a general partner and its exempt pur-
pose (the second prong or private benefit test). 142
b. Emergence of a "Control" Standard and Revenue
Ruling 98-15
In evaluating joint ventures between exempt organizations and for-profit
entities, the focus of the IRS in applying the two-prong test of GCM 39,005
began to center on whether the exempt organization had sufficient "control"
over the joint venture entity. In Private Letter Ruling 9637050, 43 the taxpayer
seeking the ruling was an acute health care facility exempt under Section
501(c)(3). The taxpayer and another tax-exempt health care organization,
which operated hospitals, were offered an opportunity to purchase a thirty-
seven and one-half percent and a twenty-five percent interest, respectively, in a
limited liability company ("LLC") owned by three physicians, none of whom
were officers or directors of the two exempt health care organizations."
The LLC proposed to construct and operate a new dialysis center. To
date, the taxpayer had owned and operated the only outpatient and inpatient
dialysis center facility in the area in which it was located and had been investi-
gating the need for a new facility because its present facility was antiquated and
failed to meet the need for such services in the area.' 4 5 The taxpayer planned
to enter into a Joint Venture Agreement ("Agreement") with the LLC with
respect to the operation of the LLC's dialysis center. Pursuant to the Agree-
ment, capital contributions to the LLC, allocations of profits and losses, and
any distributions to members would be proportionate to the members' respec-
tive interests. In addition, members would be liable for LLC debts and liabili-
139 Housing Pioneers, 65 T.C.M. at 2193.
140 Id. As to one of the limited partnerships, two of the limited partners also served as
members of the nonprofit's board of directors. Although the Tax Court's decision was based
primarily on the nonprofit's substantial commercial purpose and conference of private bene-
fit, the Court acknowledged the inherent private inurement issue by stating that, "The facts
of this case demonstrate how inextricably interwoven a commercial purpose under the opera-
tional test and the serving of a private interest under the private inurement test may become.
Consequently we need not independently consider the application of the private inurement
test to the facts of this case." Id at 2196.
141 HILL & MANCINO, supra note 88, 29.04[4], at 29-21.
142 See I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,005 (June 28, 1983), available at 1983 IRS GCM
LEXIS 56.
143 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-37-050 (June 18, 1996).
144 Id.
145 Id.
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ties in proportion to their interests.' 4 6  All such financial such financial
arrangements with the physician members would be negotiated at arm's length
and based on fair market value. The taxpayer and other exempt health care
organization, who combined would hold sixty-two and one-half percent of the
membership interest in the LLC, would elect five of the eight members of the
LLC's Board of Managers.147
In concluding that participation in the joint venture would not adversely
affect the taxpayer's exempt status, the IRS explained:
The control you [the taxpayer] and . . [the other exempt health care organization]
will exercise by electing the majority of the members of the Board of Managers of
LLC will ensure that exempt organizations retain control of the LLC Dialysis
Center's operations and will ensure that medical services will be available to anyone
in the community who needs them, regardless of ability to pay. Thus, your owner-
ship interest in LLC will enable you to promote health in a charitable manner.
1 48
In addition, the IRS found that the taxpayer's participation in the proposed
joint venture furthered, and was related to, its charitable purposes and, thus,
was not subject to UBIT under Section 513(a). 149
Revenue Ruling 98-15,150 issued in 1998, was the first guidance with
precedential value promulgated by the IRS with respect to joint ventures
between exempt organizations and for-profit participants. 15' The revenue rul-
ing was issued in response to the "rapid increase and magnitude of nonprofit,
exempt hospitals entering into joint venture arrangements with for-profit enti-
ties, in particular, the whole hospital joint venture arrangement. '  The reve-
nue ruling provided guidance in the context of two factual scenarios or
"situations," each of which has differing results as to the organization's tax-
exempt status. In both situations, an exempt organization that operated an
acute care hospital was in need of additional funding to better serve its commu-
nity and, as a consequence, participated in a joint venture (a limited liability
company ("LLC") taxed as a partnership for federal income tax purposes) with
an unrelated, for-profit corporation.153 In exchange for its LLC membership
interest, the exempt organization contributed the hospital and all of its operat-
ing assets to the LLC (i.e., a whole hospital joint venture). The for-profit entity
also contributed assets to the LLC in exchange for its LLC membership inter-
146 id.
147 id.
148 Id.; see also I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 97-36-039 (June 9, 1997) (The issue of control is
central to the ruling that the exempt organization member of a low-income housing limited
partnership, upon amending the partnership agreement, gain substantive control over the
partnership resources to cause the partnership to comply with the various low-income hous-
ing tax credit and other requirements and, thereby, further the exempt organization's
purposes.).
149 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-37-050 (June 18, 1996).
150 Rev. Rul. 98-15, 1998-1 C.B. 718.
151 Korman & Balsam, supra note 35, at 445.
151 Salins, et al., supra note 35, at 1. See also supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
Although the revenue ruling specifically addresses joint ventures between tax-exempt and
for-profit health care organizations, the guidance issued therein is equally applicable to joint
ventures outside of the health care arena.
153 Salins, et al., supra note 35, at 2.
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est. The membership interests received were proportionate to the fair market
value of each member's respective contributions. |54
Based on Plumstead and Housing Pioneers, Revenue Ruling 98-15
adopted the two-prong test set forth in GCM 39,005.155 The ruling further
provided that an exempt organization may enter into a management agreement
with a third party permitting that party to act on behalf of the organization and
have direct use of the organization's assets provided that the organization retain
ultimate authority over the assets and activities being managed and the terms
and conditions of the contract were reasonable.' 56 However, if the exempt
organization allowed that third party to control or use its activities or assets for
its own private benefit, and such benefit was "not incidental to the accomplish-
ment of exempt purposes," the organization failed the organizational and opera-
tional tests of Section 501(c)(3). 157
In applying the two-prong test of GCM 39,005, the revenue ruling attrib-
utes the activities of an LLC (treated as a partnership for federal income tax
purposes) to its exempt organization owner for purposes of evaluating whether
the exempt organization met the operational test of Section 501(c)(3).' 5 8 As
applied to partnerships, the UBIT rules under Section 512(c) also attributes an
LLC's activities to its exempt organization owner. 1
59
The revenue ruling applied the above standards to two factual "situations."
In Situation 1, the nonprofit hospital retained its tax-exempt status because it
continued to operate exclusively for a charitable purpose and only incidentally
for the private benefit of the for-profit member of the LLC. 6 ° Three of the
five members of the LLC's governing board were chosen by the exempt hospi-
tal, and two were chosen by the for-profit corporation. 6 ' A majority of the
board (i.e., three members) must approve certain major decisions relating to the
LLC's operations including its annual capital and operating budgets, distribu-
tion of earnings, selection of key executives, changes to the type of services
offered by the hospital, and renewal or termination of management agree-
ments. 162 In addition, the governing documents (i) required the LLC to operate
all of its hospital, including any hospital contributed by the for-profit member,
in a manner that furthers charitable purposes by promoting health of a broad
section of the community, and (ii) explicitly provided that the duty of the LLC
directors to operate the LLC in a manner that furthers charitable purposes over-
rode any duty they may have to operate the LLC for the financial benefit of its
154 Id.
"I See Rev. Rul. 98-15, 1998-1 C.B. 718.
156 See, e.g., Broadway Theatre League of Lynchburg, Virginia, Inc. v. United States, 293
F. Supp. 346 (W.D. Va. 1968).
157 Rev. Rul. 98-15, 1998-1 C.B. 718, 721.
158 Id.
151 Section 512(c) provides that an exempt organization that is a partner in a partnership
which conducts an unrelated trade or business with respect to its exempt activities, must
include its distributive share of the partnership's income less deductions in computing its
unrelated business income. I.R.C. § 512(c) (2004); Treas. Reg. § 1.512(c)-i (1958).
16o Rev. Rul. 98-15, 1998-1 C.B. 1718.
161 Id.
162 Id.
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members.' 63 Finally, under the facts of Situation 1, the management company
with whom the LLC had a contract was unrelated to either member of the LLC,
such contract renewable for additional five-year periods by consent of both
parties to the agreement and terminable by the LLC for cause. 164
In contrast, in Situation 2, the joint venture was held to adversely affect
the nonprofit hospital's tax-exempt status because the hospital failed to estab-
lish that it will operate exclusively for exempt purposes after it contributes its
operating assets to the LLC. 16 5 The governing documents authorized each
member of the LLC to select three representatives to the governing board, with
a majority required to approve certain major decisions relating to the LLC's
operations including the capital and operating budgets, distributions of earnings
over a required minimum level specified in the operating agreement, unusually
large contracts, and selection of key executives. 166 The governing documents
provided that the organization's purpose was to "construct, develop, own, man-
age, operate, and take other action in connection with operating the health care
facilities it own[ed] and engage[d] in other health care-related activities." 167
There was no reference to charitable activities among the stated purposes. The
management company was related to the for-profit member of the LLC and its
contract was renewable for five year periods at the sole discretion of the man-
ager, and could be terminated by the LLC for cause.1 68 In addition, the chief
executive officer and chief financial officer of the LLC, both of whom had
previously worked for the for-profit member, and the management company
would oversee the day-to-day management of the LLC.' 6 9
Based on substantial scrutiny of the revenue ruling after its release, several
conclusions can be drawn. First, the revenue ruling permits exempt organiza-
tions to participate in a joint venture, such as an LLC, and not automatically
jeopardize its tax-exempt status. 170 Second, in such situations, the LLC operat-
ing agreement should clearly provide that its charitable purposes supersede any
financial or private concerns in the event of a conflict between those goals. 17 1
In ?'ddition, all contracts and agreements between the joint venture and another
for-profit entity, such as a management agreement, must be entered into at
arm's length and reflect commercially reasonable terms.t1 2 Finally, the reve-
nue ruling clearly favors the numerical control of the joint venture's governing
board of directors or trustees by the exempt organization and "elevates" this
component to unprecedented importance. 
17 3
163 Id.; see also Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 C.B. 117 (addressing the "community benefit"
standard applicable to tax-exempt hospitals).
'" Rev. Rul. 98-15, 1998-1 C.B. 1718.
165 Id.
166 Id.
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 Id.
170 Korman & Balsam, supra note 35, at 447.
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 Id. Korman and Balsam conclude that the control requirement, which was considered in
Housing Pioneers v. Comn'r, 65 T.C.M. 2191, aff'd, 49 F.3d 1395, 1396-97 (9th Cir. 1995),
and in Est of Hawaii v. Comm'r, 71 T.C. 1067, 1080 (1979), aff'd in unpublished opinion,
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The revenue ruling also left open many issues, including whether the fac-
tors it considered important in reaching a favorable conclusion in Situation 1,
specifically the control factor, must be present in all joint ventures involving
exempt organizations, including ancillary joint ventures. As reflected in the
court decisions and administrative rulings issued subsequent to Revenue Ruling
98-15, the control requirement remains in the forefront of any analysis of the
federal income treatment of joint ventures, both whole entity and ancillary,
involving exempt organizations.' 7 4
c. Courts' Application of the "Control" Standard
In Redlands Surgical Services v. Commissioner,175 the Tax Court adopted
part of the IRS's reasoning in Revenue Ruling 98-15; specifically, the concept
that the exempt organization should have control over the joint venture's activi-
ties and operations.1 7 6 Redlands Surgical Services ("RSS") is a corporate sub-
sidiary of Redlands Health Systems, Inc. ("RHS"), an organization tax-exempt
under Section 501(c)(3). t7 7 Redlands-SCA Surgery Centers, Inc. ("SCA Cen-
ters") is a wholly-owned, for-profit subsidiary of Surgical Care Affiliates, Inc.,
a publicly-held corporation specializing in owning and managing ambulatory
647 F.2d 170 (9th Cir. 1981), and cited in the revenue ruling, was one of many influential
factors considered by the courts in those cases. However, Rev. Rul. 98-15, 1998-1 C.B. 718,
in the authors' estimation, "elevated the control factor beyond the actual language" of those
cases. However, the IRS states that:
Rev. Rul. 98-15 does not say that the tax-exempt entity must own the majority interest and
control the joint venture's governing board to remain exempt under I.R.C. 501(c)(3). However,
majority control by the tax-exempt partner is one of the most important favorable factors in
establishing that profit motives do not subvert the charitable mission. If the tax-exempt entity
lacks majority representation or vote on the board to ensure it controls major decisions, it must
have another mechanism to ensure the joint venture will operate to further the exempt organiza-
tion's charitable purposes.
See Lawrence M. Brauer, et al., Update on Health Care, IRS CPE MATERIALS FOR FY 2002,
at 161 (emphasis added), available at http://www.irs.ustreas.gov/charities/article/O,,id=
96421,00.html.
174 See infra notes 175-216 and accompanying text. See also Flynn, infra note 176, at 244
(raising the issue of the IRS's application of its "control" analysis to ancillary joint ventures
in which exempt health care entities, in particular, tend to participate).
It has been acknowledged that at some point along the continuum of possible tax consequences
the nature of the inquiry changes from one of jeopardy to exempt status to an unrelated business
income tax (UBIT) analysis under I.R.C. § 512(c) (2004). No offer has been made, however, to
draw that line precisely, and the responses from IRS representatives frequently included state-
ments that those interested should pay careful attention to the [then] anticipated decision of the
Tax Court in Redlands.
Id.
175 Redlands Surgical Servs. v. Comm'r, 113 T.C. 47 (1999), aff'd per curiam, 242 F.3d
904 (9th Cir. 2001). See infra note 184 regarding the Ninth Circuit's adoption of the Tax
Court's holding in Redlands.
176 The Tax Court's opinion in Redlands does not explicitly refer to, or rely upon, Rev. Rul.
98-15, 1998-1 C.B. 718, as authority since the case was pending before the court when the
revenue ruling was released by the IRS. See David M. Flynn, Tax Court's Decision in
Redlands Provided Limited Endorsement for IRS Position on Joint Ventures, - J. TAX'N
241 (October 1999).
177 Redlands, 113 T.C. at 48.
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surgical centers.' 7 8 In 1990, RHS became co-general partner with SCA Cen-
ters in a general partnership formed to acquire a sixty-one percent majority
interest in an existing outpatient surgical center, Inlands Surgery Center, L.P.
("Surgery Center"). 179 The partnership between RHS and SCA Centers is
known as Redlands Ambulatory Surgery Center ("RASC").' 8 ° SCA Manage-
ment, a for-profit affiliate of SCA Centers, managed the day-to-day activities of
the Surgery Center under a fifteen-year management agreement with a manage-
ment fee based on a percentage of gross revenues.' 8 ' RHS formed RSS to
succeed to its partnership interest as co-general partner; its sole purpose and
activity is to hold the partnership interest in, and help govern, RASC as the
controlling general partner of the Surgery Center.1
8 2
RSS filed for recognition of exemption with the IRS. The IRS subse-
quently issued a final adverse determination, and RSS filed for a declaratory
judgment on its exempt status pursuant to Section 7428.183 The Tax Court
rejected RSS's arguments that it had retained control over RASC and con-
cluded that RSS had "ceded effective control" over the partnership's activities,
conferring a "significant private benefit" on its for-profit partner, SCA Centers,
and therefore failed the operational test under Section 501(c)(3). 18 4 The Tax
Court determined that nothing in the partnership agreement or in any other
binding commitments relating to the Surgery Center's operations "establishe[d]
any obligation that charitable purposes be put ahead of economic objectives in
the Surgery Center's operations."' 85 Furthermore, the court concluded that
RSS's ability to veto expansion of the Surgery Center's operations did not
establish its "effective control over the manner in which the Surgery Center
conducts activities"' 86 and, thus, was not enough to ensure the predominance of
charitable purposes within the venture.
In reaching its conclusion that RSS failed to establish that it satisfied the
operational test under Section 501(c)(3), the Tax Court considered the follow-
ing five factors: (i) a "lack of any express or implied obligation" of the for-
profit parties involved in the partnership to place charitable objectives ahead of
noncharitable ones; (ii) RSS's "lack of voting control" over the partnership;
(iii) RSS's "lack of other formal or informal control sufficient to ensure further-
ance of charitable purposes;" (iv) the long-term management contract granting
SCA Management "control over the day-to-day operations" and an incentive to
178 Id. at 50.
179 Id. at 48.
180 Id. at 49-50.
181 Id. at 59-61.
182 Id. at 64.
183 Id. at 48, 70.
184 Id. at 77-78. The Ninth Circuit adopted the Tax Court's holding without additional
discussion, concluding that Redlands Surgical Services "has ceded effective control over the
operations of the partners and the Surgery Center to private parties, conferring impermissible
private benefit." Redlands Surgical Servs. v. Comm'r, 242 F.3d 904, 904 (9th Cir. 2001)
(per curium).
185 Redlands, 113 T.C. at 78-79.
186 Id. at 79-80. The Tax Court further noted that RSS's veto power similarly did not neces-
sarily indicate that the Surgery Center was not operated to "maximize profits" with respect to
its activities. Id. at 80.
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maximize profits; and (v) the market advantages secured by the SCA affiliates
as a result of their arrangements with RSS.
187
Although the Tax Court clearly viewed RSS's overall lack of control as
persuasive in reaching its final conclusion, the court specifically stated that it
did not "view any one factor as crucial."' 18 8 This statement led some commen-
tators to view Redlands as not being a complete endorsement of the IRS's
position in Revenue Ruling 98-15.189 Furthermore, other "bad" facts in Red-
lands, such as lack of charity care and provision of services to Medicaid
patients, dissipated the overall importance of the control factor in the final deci-
sion of the Tax Court.1 90 Yet, despite the Tax Court's adoption of a more
holistic approach in Redlands, where control was one of the factors considered,
the IRS continued to require such control by the exempt organization, as evi-
denced in administrative rulings and other cases litigated subsequent to its
release. 191
For example, in St. David's Health Care System, Inc. v. United States,
192
the health care system ("St. David's") owned and operated a nonprofit, tax-
exempt hospital in Austin, Texas since 1925.1 9 3 In the early 1990s, St. David's
determined that it should combine with another health care provider due to the
financial difficulties and consolidation occurring in the health care industry.19 4
Accordingly, in 1996, St. David's entered into a whole hospital joint venture,
by means of a limited partnership, with HCA, Inc. (formerly known as Colum-
bia/HCA Health care Corp.), a for-profit health care provider that already
owned several facilities in the Austin suburbs and operated approximately 180
hospitals across the country. 1 95 The partnership hired Galen Health Care, Inc.,
a subsidiary of HCA, to manage its daily operations.1
96
187 Id. at 92-93. In addition, the Tax Court rejected RSS's claim that even if it fails to
qualify for tax-exempt status on a "stand alone" basis, it nevertheless qualifies for such
status under the "integral part" doctrine. Id. at 93-94; see also Geisinger Health Plan v.
Comm'r, 100 T.C. 394, 403 (1993), affd, 30 F.3d 494 (3d Cir. 1994), and Treas. Reg.
§ 1.502-1(b) (as amended in 1970).
188 Redlands, 113 T.C. at 92.
189 Flynn, supra note 176, at 241. In fact, in the author's concluding remarks, he states that
voting control "[a]lthough very helpful, it is not absolutely necessary that voting control over
management of the joint venture be maintained by the tax-exempt organization in order to
achieve this result." Id. at 250.
... Redlands, 113 T.C. at 87-88.
191 See supra note 174 and accompanying text.
192 St. David's Health Care Sys., Inc. v. United States, 2002 WL 1335230 (W.D. Tex.
2002), vacated by 349 F.3d 232 (5th Cir. 2003).
193 Id. St. David's was formed as a Texas non-profit corporation in 1925 and recognized
the by IRS as tax-exempt under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) in 1938. Id.
194 St. David's, 349 F.3d at 233-34.
195 St. David's, 2002 WL 1335230 at *1. Pursuant to the joint venture, St. David's contrib-
uted all of its hospital and medical assets and HCA contributed all of its hospitals and medi-
cal assets located in the Austin, Texas area to the limited partnership. The partnership's two
general partners, St. David's and Round Rock Hospital, Inc., a wholly owned subsidiary of
HCA, each hold a ten percent interest. The two limited partners are St. David's and Colum-
bia/SDH Holding, a wholly-owned subsidiary of HCA. St. David's combined ownership
interest (as both a general and limited partner) is 45.9%, with the remaining 54.1% owner-
ship interest held by HCA-affiliated entities. Id.
196 St. David's, 349 F.3d at 234.
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In 1998, the IRS audited St. David's and determined that it no longer
qualified for exemption under Section 501(c)(3) due to its participation in the
partnership and, in October 2000, revoked its exempt status retroactively to the
date of its entry into the partnership in 1996.197 In response to this revocation,
St. David's paid the requisite taxes owed and filed a refund suit in the United
States District Court for the Western District of Texas. 198 Upon considering
the summary judgment motions filed by both parties, the District Court granted
the motion filed by St. David's.on the issue of its tax-exempt status for the
1996 taxable year and further ordered the payment of attorney's fees by the
government. 1
99
Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
vacated the District Court's summary judgment ruling and award of attorney's
fees, and remanded the case for further proceedings.2 °° Relying on Revenue
Ruling 98-15 and Redlands, the Fifth Circuit focused on the issue of St.
David's control over the joint venture, ultimately concluding that genuine
issues of material fact existed with respect to whether St. David's "ceded con-
trol" of its tax-exempt hospital to HCA.2 ' In analyzing the issue of control,
the Fifth Circuit found that, although St. David's appointed one-half of the
partnership's Board of Governors (HCA appointing the other half) and pos-
sessed effective veto power over any proposed Board action,2 "2 its lack of
majority voting control effectively meant that it could not "initiate action"
without the support of HCA.2 °3 The court concluded, "Thus, at best, St.
David's can prevent the partnership from taking action that might undermine its
goals; St. David's cannot necessarily ensure that the partnership will take new
action that furthers its charitable purposes. '"204
Although it recognized St. David's continued track record of providing
charity care, the Fifth Circuit nevertheless concluded that, given the extremely
long duration of its management contract with the limited partnership,20 5 the
management company, an HCA subsidiary, had no incentive to give any sus-
197 St. David's, 2002 WL 1335230 at *1.
198 St. David's, 349 F.3d at 234.
199 Id. The District Court determined that the government's position was "not substantially
justified," and therefore attorney's fees and other litigation costs totaling $951,569.83 should
be paid to St. David's. Id.
200 Id. at 244.
201 Id.
202 Id. at 241 (citing Section 1.8 of the Partnership Agreement). Under such agreement, no
measure can pass without a majority of the Board representatives of both St. David's and
HCA, thereby giving St. David's the ability to effectively veto any proposed action of the
Board. Id.
203 Id. The Fifth Circuit similarly rejected St. David's contention that its authority to
appoint the Board chairman provided it with a significant amount of control over the Board,
finding again that under Section 8.4(c) of the Partnership Agreement no member of the
Board possesses the authority to act solely on behalf of the Board. Id. at 242 n. 12.
204 Id. at 242 (citing Redlands Surgical Servs. V. Comm'r, 113 T.C. 47, 79-80 (1999)).
"[T]he non-profit did not have sufficient control in part because the non-profit could only
veto partnership action; the non-profit could not initiate action without the consent of the for-
profit entity." Id.
205 The Management Services Agreement states that Galen will retain its position until
2050, provided that an HCA affiliate remains a general partner of the partnership. Id. at n.
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tained priority to such charitable interests in operating the hospitals owned by
the limited partnership.206 Finally, the Fifth Circuit gave little effect to St.
David's argument that it could utilize the threat of dissolution to cause the
partnership to give priority to charitable concerns.2 °7 In conclusion, although
St. David's (and the District Court) considered the above factors along with
continued charity care by the hospital after its ownership by the joint venture as
providing the necessary protection and furtherance of its charitable purposes,
the Fifth Circuit ultimately still wanted to see majority control by the exempt
organization.20
8
The IRS praised the Fifth Circuit's decision in St. David's, while practi-
tioners viewed the decision as creating a per se standard-if control, namely
majority voting control, is ceded by an exempt organization in a joint venture
with a for-profit entity, more than incidental private benefit is deemed to
exist. 20 9 Furthermore, practitioners did not view the Fifth Circuit's decision as
solely applicable to the health care sector of the exempt organization commu-
nity, thus giving it broad application to all joint ventures entered into by exempt
organizations.21 0 As discussed below, the court's decision raised the additional
issue of whether such a control standard should be equally applied to ancillary
joint ventures.21
206 Id. at 242 (citing Redlands, 113 T.C. at 83-84).
[Tihis long-term management contract with an affiliate of [the for-profit entity] is a salient indi-
cator of [the non-profit's surrender of effective control over the [partnership's] operations"). The
Fifth Circuit was also concerned by the fact that a portion of Galen's fee (1%) is computed based
on the partnership's net revenues, thereby providing Galen "an incentive-maximize revenues,
and to neglect charitable goals.
Id. at n.13.
207 St. David's, 349 F.3d at 243-244. The Fifth Circuit noted that (i) Partnership Agreement
appeared to permit St. David's to request dissolution only upon a change in the law, and (ii)
the existence of a non-compete clause in the Agreement would effectively prevent St.
David's from operating in, and serving, the Austin community for two years after dissolu-
tion. Id.
208 See Fred Stokeld, Fifth Circuit Cites Control Issues in Granting IRS Win in St. David's
Joint Venture Case, 42 EXEMPT ORG. TAX. REV. 337, 338 (2003). In the article, Professor
Darryll K. Jones commented that the Fifth Circuit's decision was a "big victory" for the IRS.
"It successfully eliminated St. David's strongest and most convincing argument, that actual
charitable operations make up for a failure of formal control by the charitable partner. The
Fifth Circuit has simply stated that the post-formation activities are irrelevant in the absence
of formal organizational control." Id.
209 See Fred Stokeld, EO Community Ponders Meaning of St. David's Holding, 101 TAX
NOTES, Dec. 1, 2003, at 1069 (comments of James R. King, Esq.). In contrast, Don Spell-
man, Esq., Senior Counsel, IRS Office of Chief Counsel, Tax Exempt/Government Entities,
stated that the Fifth Circuit "did what we thought was a proper analysis and we would
suggest that the district court opinion is more the aberration." Id. at 1068. See also Stokeld,
supra note 208, at 338. In that Article, Gerald M. Griffith, Esq., stated:
Having the ability to assure that the joint venture does no harm is not enough. What the Fifth
Circuit is looking for in St. David's, what the Tax Court and Ninth Circuit looked for in Red-
lands, and what the IRS looked for in Revenue Ruling 98-15 is the ability to cause the joint
venture to do good.
Id. at 338.
21o Stokeld, supra note 209, at 1069 (comments of James R. King, Esq.).
211 See infra note 237 and accompanying text.
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However, the St. David's story did not end with the Fifth Circuit's contro-
versial decision. On remand to determine the factual issue of whether St.
David's ceded control to HCA, a federal jury decided on March 4, 2004, that
St. David's should retain its tax-exempt status despite its participation in the
whole entity joint venture with HCA.2 12 The jury decision does not, however,
signal a defeat of the IRS's control stance with respect to joint ventures.
Rather, it is viewed as a win-win outcome for both parties in the case-St.
David's retained its tax-exempt status and the IRS earned a precedential deci-
sion adopting its control standard set forth in Revenue Ruling 98-15.2 13 The
IRS continues to view its position, as supported by the Fifth Circuit decision, as
the "proper framework" for analyzing joint ventures between exempt organiza-
tions and for-profit entities.2 14 Although the IRS did preserve its right to
appeal the jury verdict by filing a notice of appeal with the Fifth Circuit,2 15 it
ultimately withdrew its appeal in exchange for St. David's agreement not to
seek attorneys' fees in the case.2 16
4. Current Federal Income Tax Law Governing Ancillary Joint
Ventures
a. Historical Overview
A review of the early rulings and case law with respect to an exempt
organization's participation in a joint venture with a for-profit entity, such as
Plumstead, Housing Pioneers and GCM 39,005, reveals that such ventures
constitute ancillary, rather than whole entity, ventures. 21 7 In fact, the distinc-
tion between ancillary and whole entity joint ventures did not occur until the
early 1990s when the health care industry, in response to its financial and other
needs, began entering into whole hospital joint ventures.2 18 Nevertheless, even
prior to Revenue Ruling 98-15, which was issued in response to such whole
hospital joint ventures, the IRS routinely blessed, via private letter rulings,
212 St. David's Health Care Sys., Inc., v. United States, 2002 WL 555095 (W.D. Tex. 2004).
The jury rendered its verdict of "We do" in response to a single jury interrogatory: "Do you
find St. David's proved by a preponderance of the evidence that it is entitled to a tax exemp-
tion for tax year 1996?" Id.
213 See Susanne Pagano & Peyton M. Sturges, St. David's Verdict May Signal End to IRS
Litigation Over Joint Ventures, DAILY TAX REP. (BNA) No. 47, at G-5 (Mar. 11, 2004).
214 See Fred Stokeld, IRS Official Unfazed by Jury Decision in Joint Venture Case, 2004
TAx NOTES TODAY, Mar. 12, 2004, at 50-5 (comments of Stephanie Caden, Esq., Senior
Legal Counsel, IRS Office of Chief Counsel, Tax Exempt/Government Entities, at the Non-
Profit Legal & Tax Conference in Washington, D.C. on March 12, 2004) "[T]he Fifth Circuit
holding provided the proper framework for judging joint ventures between non-profits and
for-profits because the opinion contained guidance making it clear that a non-profit must
have effective control in a joint venture. The jury followed that guidance and decided for St.
David's ..... Id.
215 The IRS filed a notice of appeal on May 13, 2004. See Peyton M. Sturges, Government
Initiates Appeals Process in Texas Hospital Joint Venture Litigation, DAILY TAX REP.
(BNA) May 25, 2004, at G-5.
216 See Kurt Fernandez & Peyton M. Sturges, Government, St. David's Agree To Settle
Texas Hospital Joint Venture Litigation, DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), June 14, 2004, at G-1.
217 See supra notes 115-42 and accompanying text.
218 Korman & Balsam, supra note 106, at 445; see also supra note 152 and accompanying
text.
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ancillary joint ventures between exempt hospitals or health care systems and
either physicians, other health care providers, or for-profit health care entities
(e.g., joint ventures involving ambulatory surgery centers, medical office build-
ings, various treatment centers, home care services). However, the exempt par-
ticipant routinely owned a majority interest in the joint venture entity and
appointed more than one-half of the members of such entity's governing
board.2 1 9 It is the origin of whole hospital joint ventures that appears to have
prompted the IRS to formally institute, via Revenue Ruling 98-15, a control
standard with respect to an exempt organization's participation in a joint ven-
ture with for-profit participants.2
b. Effect of the "Control" Standard on Ancillary Joint Ventures
As explained above, Revenue Ruling 98-15 explicitly addresses whole
hospital or whole entity joint ventures where the exempt organization typically
transfers all of its operating assets to a joint venture entity in exchange for a
membership interest in the entity. 22' After the release of Revenue Ruling 98-
15, it was initially uncertain whether the revenue ruling and its control standard
would apply to ancillary joint ventures.2 22 Unlike in a whole hospital joint
venture, an exempt hospital still remains in existence in an ancillary joint ven-
ture223 and is still subject to the community benefit standard.2 24 Accordingly,
the analysis of an exempt hospital's participation in an ancillary joint venture
should theoretically differ from the whole entity ventures addressed in Revenue
Ruling 98-15. Specifically, because an ancillary joint venture may involve the
contribution of only an insignificant portion of the exempt organization's total
assets, the organization's control over the joint venture is arguably less neces-
sary to ensure that it is accomplishing its exempt purposes and meeting the
operation test of Section 501(c)(3).
However, it became clear from the Redlands decision, comments made by
IRS officials, and administrative rulings issued subsequent to the revenue rul-
ing, that the IRS regarded Revenue Ruling 98-15 and its control standard as
equally applicable to ancillary joint ventures. 225 Several of the administrative
rulings issued subsequent to the revenue ruling involved joint ventures with
other exempt organizations, each of which determined that the joint venture did
not jeopardize the exempt status of either organization. 2 6 Other administrative
rulings issued by the IRS involved joint ventures between exempt organizations
219 See, e.g., I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 96-45-018 (Nov. 8, 1996); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 95-17-029
(Jan. 27, 1995).
220 Korman & Balsam, supra note 106, at 445.
221 See supra notes 153-54 and accompanying text.
222 See SANDERS, supra note 6, § 11.3(d)(ix), at 373.
223 Whereas, in a whole hospital joint venture, the hospital is no longer owned and operated
by a tax-exempt entity, but rather a for-profit limited liability company or similar entity. See
supra note 40 and accompanying text with respect to the community benefit standard
applied to nonprofit hospitals pursuant to Rev. Rul. 69-545.
224 SANDERS, supra note 6, § 1li.3(d)(ix), at 373.
225 Id. at n.276 (citing comments by Catherine E. Livingston, Associate Tax Counsel, U.S.
Treasury Department).
226 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Ruls. 199913035 (Dec. 22, 1998), 200102052 (Oct. 10, 2000),
200117043 (Jan. 30, 2001), and 200218037 (Mar. 27, 2001).
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and for-profit participants in which Revenue Ruling 98-15 along with its con-
trol standard was applied in full force.227
A private letter ruling issued in late 2001 illustrates the IRS's post-Reve-
nue Ruling 98-15 posture as to ancillary joint ventures.228 This letter ruling
reflects IRS's strict adherence to the facts of "Situation 1" of Revenue Ruling
98-15 in issuing a favorable determination with respect to an ancillary joint
venture. 229 The joint venture involved the formation of a limited liability com-
pany by a tax-exempt hospital and a group of physicians, the purpose of which
was to provide, and increase the availability of, a new medical treatment. The
hospital contributed the equipment to perform the new treatment to the LLC in
exchange for its membership interest and the physicians contributed cash in
exchange for theirs, such interests being proportional to the value of their
respective contributions.2 3 °
Under the LLC's operating agreement, allocations of income, loss, deduc-
tion, and credits were in proportion to the members' percentage interests. As in
Situation I of Revenue Ruling 98-15, the tax-exempt hospital appointed a
majority of the LLC's five-member board of directors.2 3' In addition, the
LLC's operating agreement clearly provided that its charitable purposes must
override any duty that the board members may have to operate for the financial
benefit of the LLC members, with the board lacking the power to initiate any
action with respective to the LLC's charity care policy without the direct con-
sent of the exempt hospital.2 32 Based on these and other factors, the IRS found
that the hospital's participation in the joint venture did not adversely affect, but
rather furthered, its exempt purposes and status under Section 501(c)(3).23 3
227 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Ruls. 200118054 (Feb. 7, 2001), 200206058 (Nov. 16, 2001), and
200304041 (Nov. 1, 2002); Tech. Adv. Mem. 2001-51-045 (July 25, 2001).
228 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2002-06-058 (Nov. 16, 2001).
229 See Hospital Keeps Tax-Exempt Status in Doctor Joint Venture by Holding Controlling
Interest, 11 HEALTH LAW REP. (BNA) Mar. 7, 2002, at 381 which states that:
The ruling does not reduce the uncertainty that prior IRS guidance on tax treatment of joint
ventures between for-profit and non-profit health care entities has left, because the plan fits
squarely within the field of activities that the IRS has said are permissible under Revenue Ruling
98-15, according to health care attorneys.
Id.
In the Article, Douglas K. Anning, Esq., commented that, "(i]n a certain sense, it [PLR
200206058] is not that illuminating because the facts fit squarely within the facts of Situation
I of Revenue Ruling 98-15." He further stated that health and tax-exempt law practitioners
were really seeking guidance in the "gray area" between what the IRS has ruled as permissi-
ble (i.e., Situation I of Rev. Rul. 98-15) and what it ruled as not (i.e., Situation 2 of the
revenue ruling). Id.
230 I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 2002-06-058. The value of the contributed equipment represented
only about three percent of the exempt hospital's total assets.
231 Id. The tax-exempt hospital appoints three members (sixty percent) and a majority of
the physicians appoint the remaining two members (forty percent) on the board. The hospi-
tal's representatives on the board will be comprised of community leaders with experience in
health care matters. The operating agreement contains a conflict of interest policy to address
any transactions or arrangements between the LLC and its board members. Id.
232 id.
233 Id. For the same reasons, the IRS also found that the hospital's distributive share of the
LLC's profits is not subject to UBIT under I.R.C. § 512(c) (2004). Id.
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The strict adherence of these letter rulings to the tenets of Revenue Ruling
98-15 evoked a common response-a call to action by tax and health law prac-
titioners for the IRS to provide guidance on the "gray areas" that fall between
the "good" and "bad" situations discussed in Revenue Ruling 98-15, including
ancillary joint ventures. 234 Despite this call to action, in late 2001, the IRS
actually announced that it would not issue any private letter rulings with respect
to joint ventures, whether whole entity or ancillary, between tax-exempt hospi-
tals and for-profit entities.23 5 Some practitioners felt that this announcement
was made because the IRS did not want to issue any rulings in the joint venture
area that might jeopardize its position in the pending St. David's litigation.23 6
However, as previously stated, the Fifth Circuit's decision in St. David's did
little to address the "gray areas" left open by Revenue Ruling 98-15, including
the treatment of ancillary joint ventures.2 37
234 Barbara Yuill, No IRS Private Rulings on Way for Charitable Hospital Joint Ventures,
HEALTH LAW REP. (BNA) Dec. 13, 2001, at 1867. In the Article, T.J. Sullivan, Esq., com-
mented that the IRS "needs to adopt a workable position on ancillary joint ventures that
don't fit squarely" within the "situations" of Rev. Rul. 98-15. "There are thousands of ancil-
lary joint ventures out there structured before the release of Revenue Ruling 98-15 that are
producing income for their tax-exempt participants. No responsible law firm or accounting
firm in the country is telling those exempt organizations to report the income as unrelated" to
an exempt purpose. He further stated that any "hard line" taken by the IRS in a particular
case would likely result in litigation. Id. See also supra note 229.
235 Barbara Yuill, No IRS Private Rulings Expected for Charitable Hospital Joint Ventures,
DAILY TAX REP. (BNA) Dec. 10, 2001, at G-4 (comments of Marvin R. Friedlander, group
manager in the IRS's Office of Rulings and Agreements at ALI-ABA Conference on Chari-
table Organizations). Mr. Friedlander commented that "[wie [the IRS] are trying to work
with exempt organizations to establish some rules in the gray areas." He further noted that
IRS guidance typically travels on a "slow conveyor belt." Id. Almost a year later at the
conference for the American Health Lawyers Association, Mr. Friedlander similarly stated
that the IRS intended to provide guidance on ancillary joint ventures, but still maintained its
position that a nonprofit's control of a joint venture involving a for-profit entity is a "signifi-
cant factor in ensuring the venture 'furthers charitable purposes exclusively.'" Peyton M.
Sturges, IRS Officials Outline Ongoing Priorities, Intent to Withdraw 501(m) HMO Guide-
lines, HEALTH LAW REP. (BNA), Nov. 7, 2002, at 1589.
236 See Yuill, supra note 234, at 1867 (comments of Jerry R. Peters, Esq.).
237 Stokeld, supra note 208, at 338-39. Gerald M. Griffith commented that the Fifth Cir-
cuit's decision in St. David's:
[Pluts whole hospital joint ventures in the same limbo state they were in before the district court
opinion. It also clouds the waters somewhat on whether the IRS will now take a similarly con-
servative position on ancillary joint ventures or whether it will continue moving toward treating
ancillary joint ventures as raising nothing more than potential unrelated business income issues.
Id. at 338-39. In similar comments, T.J. Sullivan advised that the Fifth Circuit's decision did
not mean that it was not time to abandon ancillary joint ventures even if it did leave open
issues unresolved:
[Tihere is at least some possibility that the IRS might adopt guidance down the road that does
distinguish between whole hospital and ancillary joint ventures, and [the IRS] might ultimately
be convinced that the public is better served by having joint ventures that have at least some
charitable aspects to their activities than seeing a wholesale transfer of what could be charitable
health care provisions into the taxable sector, where there would be no pressure of public expec-
tation of charitability.
Stokeld, supra note 209, at 1069.
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c. Proposed Revenue Ruling on Ancillary Joint Ventures
In early August 2002, the American Bar Association's Health Law Section
developed, drafted, and submitted a proposed revenue ruling on ancillary joint
ventures to the IRS in an effort to jump start some additional guidance with
respect to ancillary joint ventures. 238 The intent of the proposed revenue ruling
was to facilitate the use of ancillary joint ventures by exempt health care prov-
iders without significant risk of loss of exemption or insistence on business
terms undesirable to the for-profit participants in the venture. 239 The drafters
of the ruling also hoped that the IRS's adoption of the ruling would "clarify that
'ancillary' situations do not raise exemption issues," but only raise potential
UBIT issues. 24 ° Accordingly, the ruling took the position that the "exemption
analysis" of Revenue Ruling 98-15, which focused on the exempt organiza-
tion's control over the joint venture's operations, was unnecessary in the con-
text of ancillary joint ventures. 24 '
The proposed revenue ruling presented two virtually identical situations in
which a tax-exempt community hospital and an unrelated, for-profit entity enter
into a joint venture, by means of a limited liability company, to own and oper-
ate an ambulatory surgery center.242 In contrast to Revenue Ruling 98-15, the
proposed ruling only involved the exempt hospital's transfer of an insubstantial
portion of its exempt activities to the venture (thus, an ancillary rather than a
whole entity joint venture).24 3 The proposed ruling acknowledged that even
though the IRS "appears to agree that the tax rules are different for ancillary
joint ventures," no precedential guidance with respect to such joint ventures
had been issued up to that point.244 The proposed ruling sought to provide
guidance on three major issues: (1) Participation by an exempt organization in
an ancillary joint venture does not jeopardize its tax-exempt status, and, there-
fore, the organization's only tax risk is that its distributive share of the LLC's
income may be subject to UBIT; (2) voting control by the exempt organization
238 See ABA Send IRS Proposed Revenue Ruling On Ancillary Joint Ventures, TAX NoTEs
TODAY, Oct. 1, 2002, at 190-14 [hereinafter ABA Proposed Ruling]; see also William R.
Peek, Gordon M. Clay & Susan A. Cobb, Proposed Joint Venture Examples for Inclusion in
Revenue Ruling, MATERIALS FOR ABA TAX SECTION 2002 MID-YEAR MEETING, available at
http://www.abanet.org/tax/home.html. The ABA Committee on Exempt Organizations'
Task Force on Joint Ventures ("EO Task Force") similarly submitted to the IRS five exam-
ples of real-world, non-health care joint ventures between exempt organizations and for-
profit entities along with a short analysis of each example. Similar to the proposed revenue
ruling submitted by the ABA's Health Law Section, the intent of the EO Task Force's sub-
mission was to assist the IRS in providing guidance in the "gray area" created by the release
of Revenue Ruling 98-15 (i.e., the factual area lying between the good and bad situations);
specifically, ancillary joint ventures. Some of the examples contain facts where the exempt
organization possesses less than voting control, which is held to be appropriate under certain
circumstances. Id.
239 See J. Christine Harris, Proposed Revenue Ruling On Ancillary Joint Ventures Much
Needed, Say EO Reps, TAX NOTES, Oct. 9, 2002, at 196-10, available at LEXIS 2005 TNT
196-10.
240 Id. (comments of David M. Flynn).
241 Id.
242 ABA Proposed Ruling, supra note 238.
243 Id.
244 Id.
Fall 2005]
NEVADA LAW JOURNAL
is not as important in an ancillary joint venture as it is in a whole entity joint
venture; and (3) the private benefit test is not applicable in determining whether
the exempt organization's participation is subject to UBIT.24 5
In both Situations 1 and 2 of the proposed revenue ruling, the LLC was
managed by a six-member board of managers, three members of which were
selected by the exempt organization and three of which were selected by the
for-profit participant. The primary differences between the two scenarios
involved the following facts particular to Situation 2: (1) The LLC operating
agreement contained no provision requiring the ASC's operations to comply
with the community benefit standard of Revenue Ruling 69-545, and did not
provide any charity care policy; (2) the management agreement was similarly
devoid of any charity care or community benefit requirements, thereby failing
to ensure the furtherance of the hospital's exempt purposes; and (3) the busi-
ness plan approved by the LLC' s board of directors emphasized profitability of
surgical procedures and a marketing focus on private pay and private insurance
patients. In both Situations, the proposed ruling concluded that participation
in the ancillary joint ventures did not by itself jeopardize the hospital's exemp-
tion under Section 501(c)(3). The proposed ruling held that in Situation 1 the
hospital's participation in the joint venture was substantially related to its
exempt purposes and, therefore, its distributive share from the venture was not
subject to UBIT.247 In contrast, the participation in the joint venture by the
hospital in Situation 2 was held to be unrelated to its exempt status because the
hospital could not ensure that the ambulatory surgical center "will be operated
in a manner that is substantially related to its exempt purposes." Accordingly,
the hospital's distributive share in Situation 2 was subject to UBIT.248
Accordingly, the ABA Health Section's proposed revenue ruling on ancil-
lary joint ventures focused its analysis on one essential issue-whether the
exempt organization's participation in the joint venture is subject to UBIT.24 9
The basis for this focus is that, unlike whole entity joint ventures, only an
insubstantial amount of the exempt organization's assets are contributed to the
joint venture and, as a result, the exempt organization remains intact with sub-
stantial exempt activities separate and apart from those conducted by the joint
venture. As discussed in Part III of this Article, a prominent scholar in the
exempt organization area consistently advocates this UBIT-focused analysis, 5 °
which is subject to criticism. 25 ' Although the IRS did not officially comment
on the ABA Health Section's proposed ruling or rush to issue a revenue ruling
similar to it,25 2 portions of the proposed ruling appear to be adopted in Revenue
Ruling 2004-51 issued by the IRS in 2004, as discussed below.
245 Id.
246 Id.
247 id.
248 Id.
249 Id.
250 See infra notes 282-92 and accompanying text.
251 See infra notes 302-09 and accompanying text.
252 See SANDERS, supra note 6, Supp. § 4.2(e), at 37. The IRS similarly did not comment
on the ancillary joint venture examples submitted by the EO Task Force. Id.; see also supra
note 238.
[Vol. 6:21
RELINQUISH CONTROL!
d. John Gabriel Ryan Association
Within several months of the submission of the ABA's proposed revenue
ruling on ancillary joint ventures to the IRS, The John Gabriel Ryan Associa-
tion filed a petition in the United States Tax Court challenging the IRS's denial
of its application for tax exemption under Section 501(c)(3). 253 The Associa-
tion is a health care organization affiliated with Providence Health System, a
tax-exempt Catholic health care provider.2 54 The Association's sole activity is
to participate in five ancillary joint ventures with other health care entities.
After almost four years of consideration of the Association's application for
tax-exempt status, the IRS issued a final adverse ruling with respect to the
Association's request for exemption on the bases that: (i) the Association was
not operated exclusively for exempt purposes within the meaning of Section
501(c)(3); and (ii) the Association's activities benefit private interests more
than incidentally and, thus, do not exclusively further exempt charitable
purposes. 2 5
5
In two of the five joint ventures in which the Association participated, the
venture was owned and managed by only exempt organizations. 256 In the third
joint venture, the Association served as a co-general partner, owning ninety-
nine percent of each venture jointly with its sole corporate member, Providence
Health System-Washington, an entity tax-exempt under Section 501(c)(3). 257
In the fourth joint venture, the Association was the sole general partner in a
limited partnership that owned, operated and leased a medical office building
located next to a tax-exempt hospital.2 58 In the fifth joint venture, the Associa-
tion was a co-general partner with a for-profit entity, each owning a fifty per-
253 See Petition of The John Gabriel Ryan Association, John Gabriel Ryan Ass'n v.
Comm'r, No. 16811-02X (T.C. 2002), reprinted in U.S. Tax Court Petition in John Gabriel
Ryan Association v. Commissioner, DAILY TAx REPORT: PRIMARY SOURCE MATERIAL:
COURT MOTIONS (BNA online), Nov. 6, 2002 (petition filed October 25, 2002).
254 Id. The Association's sole corporate member, Providence Health System-Washington
("PHC-Washington"), is an exempt organization under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). Id.
255 Id.
256 Id. The Association is a co-general partner in Valley Imaging Partners with PHC-Wash-
ington, its sole corporate member, and Yakima Valley Memorial Hospital Association, both
exempt organizations under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). Yakima Valley owns a fifty percent interest
with Association and PHS-Washington jointly owning the remaining fifty percent interest in
the joint venture. Id. The Association also serves as a co-general partner in the Tanasbourne
Medical Partnership with Tuality Community Hospital, Inc., an exempt organization under
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). Id.
157 Id. The Association is a co-general partner in Providence Imaging Center Joint Venture
with PHS-Washington and Alaska Medical Imaging, Inc., an Alaska for-profit corporation.
Id.
258 Id. The Association is the sole general partner of, and owns a fifty percent interest in,
the Greater Valley Medical Building Partnership, L.P. Real Med LLC, a California limited
liability company, is the limited partner and owns a fifty percent interest in the limited part-
nership. Id. The Association possesses complete authority and control over the manage-
ment of the limited partnership. Id. The medical building is located adjacent to a hospital
owned and operated by Providence Health System, a tax-exempt entity with whom Associa-
tion is affiliated. Id.
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cent interest in the venture.259  In light of Revenue Ruling 98-15 and
subsequent administrative guidance, it was the structure of this fifth joint ven-
ture that appeared to have presented some potential problem to the IRS with
respect to the Association's application for exemption. Nevertheless, certain
provisions in the joint venture agreement attempted to ensure the furtherance of
the Association's exempt charitable purposes, including the promotion of
health, and precedence of the venture's charitable activities over its profit
motives and goals.26 °
Pursuant to a settlement of the case between the two parties, the IRS
issued a favorable determination letter on June 25, 2003 granting the Associa-
tion tax-exempt status under Section 501(c)(3). 26 1 The IRS did not articulate
the grounds for its determination, but presumably it became comfortable with
the fact that the various joint venture and partnership agreements provided
some credible and verifiable protections of the Association's charitable pur-
poses other than its majority control of the venture.26 2 The settlement of this
case was viewed as significant by practitioners in the exempt organizations
sector because the IRS implicitly blessed an ancillary joint venture structure,
namely the fifth joint venture discussed above, which involved equal board
representation and control by both the tax-exempt and for-profit participants
but provided safeguards in the joint venture agreement which ensured that the
venture operates in furtherance of the exempt participant's charitable pur-
poses.263 Even though at the time of the settlement the federal district court in
the St. David's case had already approved a similar fifty-fifty control scenario
in a whole hospital joint venture (which was being appealed to the Fifth Cir-
259 Id. The Association is a co-general partner in Providence St. Peter-South Sound
Regional MRI Center ("South Sound") with South Sound Radiologists, Inc., P.S., a Wash-
ington professional services corporation. Id.
260 Id. See also SANDERS, supra note 6, Supp. § 4.2(f.2), at 45. Some of the provisions in
the joint venture agreement include:
(i) South Sound must continuously observe the Ethical and Religious Directives ("ERDs") for
Catholic Health Facilities instituted by the National Conference of Catholic Bishops and the
United States Catholic Conference;
(ii) All facilities operated by South Sound must be available on an "open door" policy basis and
not deny services to any individuals based on their inability to pay;
(iii) The Association's right to unilaterally dissolve the joint venture upon notice and its right of
first refusal to purchase all or a portion of South Sound's assets upon dissolution; and
(iv) Certain decisions of the South Sound's Management Committee, including modifying the
joint venture agreement or modifying its purposes, must approved by the Board of Directors of
each participant in the joint venture.
Id.
In addition, the Association stated in its Tax court petition that South Sound services Medi-
care and Medicaid patients, provides charity care, and contributes to a local tax-exempt
hospital's foundation for charity care and education. Id.
261 Actually, two determination letters were issued by the IRS, both dated June 25, 2003.
The first granted the Association its tax-exempt status under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3), effective
December 30, 1998, while the second letter granted the Association an exemption under
I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) for the period January 1, 1995 through December 30, 1998. See Peyton
M. Sturges, Parties-Dismiss Joint Venture Challenge in Wake of IRS Decision to Grant
Exemption, DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), July 11, 2003, at G-2.
262 See SANDERS, supra note 6, Supp. § 4.2(f.2), at 46.
263 Sturges, supra note 261, at G-2 (comments of T.J. Sullivan).
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cuit), the John Gabriel Association settlement nevertheless represented the
IRS's first approval of such a control structure since its issuance of Revenue
Ruling 98-15.264
Notwithstanding its importance in revealing a potential change in the
IRS's position with respect to ancillary joint ventures, the settlement still did
not constitute formal, precedential guidance.265 The Fifth Circuit's opinion in
St. David's, released later that year, further clouded the picture with respect to
the IRS's treatment of ancillary joint ventures, continuing to leave unaddressed
the "gray areas" created by Revenue Ruling 98-15.
e. IRS's Most Recent Guidance on Ancillary Joint Ventures -
Revenue Ruling 2004-51
In an effort to provide precedential guidance specific to ancillary joint
ventures, the IRS recently released Revenue Ruling 2004-51.266 The facts of
the ruling involved a university exempt from federal income tax under Sec-
tion 501(c)(3), which, as part of its educational programs, offered seminars
during the summer to assist elementary and secondary school teachers in fur-
ther developing and improving their teaching skills. To expand the scope and
availability of these seminars, the university entered into a joint venture, by
means of an LLC, with a for-profit entity that conducted interactive video train-
ing programs.26 7 The LLC's governing documents, its Articles of Organization
and Operating Agreement, stated that its sole purpose was to "offer teaching
training seminars at off-campus locations using interactive video technol-
ogy. '26 8 The university and the for-profit member each held a fifty percent
membership interest in the LLC, such interests proportionate to the value of
their respective capital contributions.2 69
In addition to containing provisions similar to those discussed in prior pri-
vate letter rulings addressing joint ventures,27 ° the LLC's governing documents
provided for a six-member governing board, with three directors to be selected
by the university and the remaining three by the for-profit member. The con-
tent of the seminars conducted by the LLC would mirror the material covered
in the university's seminars, the primary difference being that the teachers
would participate through the use of an interactive video link from multiple
locations, as opposed to one location on the university's campus. Pursuant to
the governing documents, the university had the "exclusive right to approve
curriculum, training materials, and instructors, and to determine the standards
264 Id.
265 See SANDERS, supra note 6, Supp. § 4.2(f.2), at 46.
266 Rev. Rul. 2004-51, 2004-22 I.R.B. 974.
267 Id.
268 Id.
269 Id.
270 The governing documents require that: (i) all returns of capital, allocation and distribu-
tions be made in accordance with each member's ownership interest; and (ii) all contracts
and transactions by the LLC be negotiated at arm's length and reflect fair market value for
the services or goods received. Id.
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for successful completion of the seminars. '2 71 In addition, the documents man-
dated that the LLC refrain from engaging in any activities that may jeopardize
the university's exemption under Section 501(c)(3). 27 2 The ruling specifically
stated that the university's participation in the joint venture constituted an
"insubstantial part" of its activities within the meaning of Section 501(c)(3) and
applicable regulations thereunder.2 7 3
The IRS ultimately concluded that because the activities that the university
conducted through the LLC did not constitute a substantial part of its overall
activities, the university's participation in the joint venture would not adversely
affect its tax-exempt status.274 In addition, based on facts which establish that
the LLC's activities were substantially related to the exempt purposes and func-
tions of the university, the university's distributive share of income from the
LLC would not be subject to UBIT.27 5 In reaching its conclusions, the IRS
cited to the Ninth Circuit decision in Redlands Surgical Services and the Fifth
Circuit decision in St. David's, as well as Revenue Ruling 98-15, but failed to
apply them to the facts of the ruling explicitly. Furthermore, there was no
specific discussion in the ruling's analysis regarding the "control" standard of
Revenue Ruling 98-15 and its effect, or lack thereof, on the disposition of the
ruling. However, under the facts of the ruling, the university did have "exclu-
sive control" over the LLC's curriculum which was directly related to the uni-
versity's exempt educational purposes-a fact that the IRS acknowledged as
noteworthy.2 76 The ruling also did not directly discuss whether the lack of
language in the LLC's governing documents with respect to the precedence of
charitable activities over for-profit motives or goals was significant or not.277
f State of the Union after Revenue Ruling 2004-51
Revenue Ruling 2004-51 represents indisputable progress because it is the
first instance since Revenue Ruling 98-15 in which the IRS acknowledges and
supports equal ownership by the exempt and for-profit participants in a joint
venture, provided some protections are in place to ensure the furtherance of the
organization's exempt purposes. Nevertheless, the revenue ruling fails to take
additional steps to address ancillary joint ventures that might not meet the
IRS's current standards. For instance, the revenue ruling does not address situ-
ations where the exempt participant in an ancillary joint venture possesses less
271 Id. The for-profit member of the LLC is granted the "exclusive right" to select the
locations for participants to interactively link to the seminars and to approve all other person-
nel necessary to conduct the seminars (e.g., camera operators). Id.
272 Id.
273 Id.; see Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(l) (as amended in 1990).
274 Rev. Rul. 2004-51, 2004-22 I.R.B.
275 Id.
276 See Fred Stokeld, et al., ABA Tax Section: EO Reps Start Meeting Discussing Rev. Rul.
on Ancillary Joint Ventures, 44 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 273 (2004) (comments of Catherine
E. Livingston, IRS Assistant Chief Counsel). Ms. Livingston specifically stated that the
regulations defining educational purpose were "an important underpinning to our [the IRS's]
ability to do the guidance." Id.
277 See Fred Stokeld, Practitioners Pleased With Revenue Ruling on Ancillary Joint Ven-
tures, 44 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 284 (2004) (comments of Michael I. Sanders, Esq.).
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than fifty percent control on the governing board.2 78 Many practitioners have
argued that even equal control is not realistic in the current health care market
and contend that the IRS is creating an "unrealistic and unattainable stan-
dard."' 27 9 In addition, the ruling does not address situations where the exempt
participant does not have "exclusive control" over activities that do relate to its
own exempt purposes, or similarly, situations where the activities of the joint
venture are not "substantially related" to the exempt participant's purposes.2 8 0
In response to such unaddressed areas, an IRS representative unofficially issued
a poignant reminder-Revenue Ruling 98-15 is "still on the books" and "Reve-
nue Ruling 2004-51 does nothing to modify Revenue Ruling 98-15. ' '28I Such
comments seem to imply that the "control" standard of Revenue Ruling 98-15
has not been totally disregarded with respect to ancillary joint ventures.
Now that an extensive groundwork has been laid with respect to the evolu-
tion of the IRS's treatment of joint ventures involving exempt organizations
and for-profit participants, both whole entity and ancillary, this Article attempts
to address whether the IRS's current "safe" stance, the imposition of a control
standard, on ancillary joint ventures is viable. Should a control standard, even
the presence of equal control with some procedural safeguards as in Revenue
Ruling 2004-51, be instituted with respect to ancillary joint ventures? Or, as
advocated by some scholars, should the IRS analysis with respect to ancillary
joint ventures be based solely on traditional UBIT principles (to which the IRS
eluded, yet failed to definitively adopt, in Revenue Ruling 2004-51)? Or does
the IRS already possess the necessary statutory and regulatory resources to
address ancillary joint ventures, thus obviating the need for some bright-line
standard? Part III of this Article explores various proposals calling for a differ-
ent analysis with respect to the federal income tax treatment of an exempt
organization's participation in an ancillary joint venture.
III. EXISTING PROPOSALS FOR THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX TREATMENT OF
EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS' PARTICIPATION IN
ANCILLARY JOINT VENTURES
This is not the first Article to address the federal income tax treatment of
joint ventures, ancillary or whole hospital, and to question the viability of the
IRS's reliance on a "control" standard in determining such treatment. As an
alternative to the IRS's control standard, scholars and practitioners in the
exempt organizations area have advocated other proposals. Each of these alter-
native proposals has its strengths and weaknesses, and, therefore, provides val-
uable insights. Because part of the alternative proposal advocated in this
Article builds on two of these proposals, they are explored in greater detail
below.
278 See generally, Stokeld, supra note 276.
279 See J. Christine Harris, EO Reps Call IRS's Stance On Joint Ventures "Unrealistic", 98
TAX NOTES, Mar. 24, 2003, at 1816 (comments by Brian Menkes).
280 See generally, Stokeld, et al., supra note 276, at 273.
281 Id. (comments made by Catherine E. Livingston, IRS Assistant Chief Counsel, at the
ABA Tax Section Meeting in Washington, D.C., on May 7, 2004).
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A. UBIT Analytical Framework
1. Overview
One proposal for analyzing the effect on the tax-exempt status of joint
ventures, including ancillary ventures-the UBIT-has been consistently advo-
cated by Professor John Colombo.2 82 As Professor Colombo points out, the
existence of the UBIT "reinforces the basic rule that an exempt organization
can engage in significant business activity that is not in furtherance of a charita-
ble purpose without losing exemption-after all, there would be no reason to
tax unrelated business activity if that activity caused loss of exemption in the
first place."'2 8 3 Based on the statutory and regulatory structure of the UBIT, the
Professor has devised an "analytical framework" of four possibilities for evalu-
ating the federal income tax consequences of a business activity or transaction
entered into by an exempt organization. First, if the business activity itself is
charitable, there is no UBIT issue and no effect on the organization's tax-
exempt status.28 4 Second, if the business activity is not itself charitable, but is
"substantially related" to the organization's exempt purposes, the net earnings
from the activity are not subject to the UBIT and there is no effect on the
organization's tax-exempt status because the activity is deemed to be "in fur-
therance of' the organization's exempt purposes under the UBIT regula-
tions.285 Third, if the activity or transaction represents an "unrelated" business
activity, but is not "substantial" in relation to exempt purposes activities carried
on the organization, the net earnings from the activity are subject to the UBIT,
but there is no effect on the organization's tax-exempt status. 286 Finally, if the
business activity is unrelated and is substantial in relation to the organization's
exempt activities, the organization may possibly lose its exemption because of
its failure to meet operational test of Section 501(c)(3).2 87
Professor Colombo contends that the application of this UBIT analytical
framework to joint ventures, both whole entity and ancillary, "helps isolate fac-
tors that will be relevant at each analytical stage," and brings into question the
IRS's current analysis with respect to joint ventures. 28 8 In applying the analyti-
cal framework set forth above, the first issue is whether the joint venture, in and
282 See John D. Colombo, Private Benefit, Joint Ventures, and the Death of Health Care as
an Exempt Purpose, 34 J. HEALTH L. 505 (Fall 2001) [hereinafter, Colombo, Death of
Health Care]; John D. Colombo, A Framework for Analyzing Exemption and UBIT Effects
of Joint Ventures, 34 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV., Nov. 2001, at 187 [hereinafter, Colombo,
UBIT Framework]; John D. Colombo, Commercial Activity and Charitable Tax Exemption,
44 Wm. & MARY LAW REV. 487 (2002); and John D. Colombo, Regulating Commercial
Activity by Exempt Charities: Resurrecting the Commensurate-in-Scope Doctrine, 39
EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 341 (2003).
283 Colombo, UBIT Framework, supra note 282, at 188.
284 Id. An example given by the Professor is the construction and operation of a low-
income housing project which would be considered charitable because it "relieves the poor
and distressed." Id.
285 Id. at 189 (providing an example of a tax-exempt hospital that operates a pharmacy that
sells drugs only to hospital patients).
286 Id. (providing an example of a tax-exempt hospital that operates a pharmacy that sells to
both hospital patients and non-patients).
287 Id. See supra notes 45-54 and accompanying text for a discussion of the operational test
under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2004).
288 Colombo, UBIT Framework, supra note 282, at 189.
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of itself, constitutes a charitable or otherwise exempt purpose activity with
respect to the exempt organization. 289 As to joint ventures entered into by tax-
exempt hospitals, the "charitable" nature of the venture's activities will be
determined by whether the "community benefit standard" enunciated in Reve-
nue Ruling 69-545 is met.29 ° Likewise, if the joint venture involves a state
university, the issue of whether the venture's activities are "educational" must
be resolved by applicable regulations and administrative rulings that address
what constitutes an educational activity. In either instance, control of the ven-
ture by the exempt organization is only a factor in determining whether the
venture is charitable or educational.2 9 1 If the venture's activities are charitable
or educational, then category (1) above governs the result. If the joint venture's
activities do not meet the standards for charitable or educational, then category
(2) above governs and the issue becomes one of whether the activity is never-
theless "substantially related" to the organization's exempt purposes, and so on
to categories (3) and (4).292
In applying the above analytical framework to ancillary joint ventures, the
resulting analysis is surprisingly uncomplicated. Because by the very nature of
an "ancillary" joint venture an exempt organization is conducting its own chari-
table or exempt activities other than its participation in the joint venture, Pro-
fessor Colombo suggests that the resulting analysis focuses on categories (2)
and (3) of his proposed framework-whether the activities of the joint venture
are "related" to the organization's exempt purposes.2 93 Thus, if deemed
related, there would be no threat to the organization's exempt status and no
UBIT consequences (i.e., category (2)). If unrelated, the exempt organization's
distributive share from the venture would be subject to the UBIT, but there still
would be no threat to its exempt status (i.e., category (3)).294 Presumably, cate-
gory (4) would never apply in the context of an ancillary joint venture provided
participation in the venture is truly "ancillary" or insubstantial in comparison to
the organization's exempt activities. 295 As a result, in the context of ancillary
joint ventures, the proposed framework would focus on one primary issue-
whether the exempt organization's distributive share from the joint venture is
subject to the UBIT.2 9 6
In addition, control of the joint venture entity should be irrelevant as to the
exempt organization's tax-exempt status; instead, it may only be relevant in
289 Id.
290 See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
291 Colombo, UBIT Framework, supra note 282, at 189. In fact, Professor Colombo states
that "under the framework.... control is not, and should not be, elevated to the per se rule
that Rev. Rul. 98-15 appears to make it. The issue is not control per se; rather the issue is
simply whether the venture meets the general criteria of being a charitable activity. Control
might also be relevant to analyzing whether a non-charitable activity is 'related' or 'unre-
lated' for UBIT purposes .... Id. at 191. See also Colombo, Death of Health Care, supra
note 282 ("[U]nder the four-alternative analysis for classifying the effects of joint ventures
... control should be an issue with regard to tax-exempt status only in a whole hospital
joint venture.").
292 Colombo, UBIT Framework, supra note 282, at 189-90.
293 Id. at 190.
294 Id.
295 id.
296 Id.
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determining whether the joint venture activity is subject to the UBIT.2 97 How-
ever, Professor Colombo's proposed framework leaves unresolved the issue of
when a venture is truly "ancillary" or insubstantial in comparison to the organi-
zation's charitable or exempt activities. Is this an issue that is resolved by the
basic tenets of, and case law interpreting, the UBIT? Or, if the IRS does adopt
a pure UBIT analysis with respect to ancillary joint ventures, should there be a
bright-line rule or defined limitation as to when a joint venture or the aggregate
of all the organization's ancillary joint ventures crosses the line from ancillary
or insubstantial to substantial? As presented below, a practitioner in the
exempt organizations area proposes such a bright-line rule with an aggregation
limitation.29 8
Professor Colombo's proposed UBIT analytical framework was implicitly
adopted by the ABA Health Section in its proposed revenue ruling regarding
ancillary joint ventures submitted to the IRS in 2002.299 Clearly, the IRS has
not adopted Professor Colombo's UBIT-based analysis in addressing whole
entity joint ventures because Revenue Ruling 98-15 is "still on the books" and
no subsequent revenue ruling has modified it in any way.3" In Revenue Rul-
ing 2004-51, the IRS appears to adopt in part Professor Colombo's analytical
framework with respect to ancillary joint ventures. However, it is not clear that
the IRS has or will fully adopt a pure UBIT-based analysis with respect to
ancillary joint ventures because, as previously discussed, the revenue ruling
does not address certain situations, such as when: (i) the exempt participant in
an ancillary joint venture possesses less than fifty percent control on the gov-
erning board; (ii) the exempt participant does not have exclusive control over
the venture's activities; or (iii) the venture's activities are unrelated to the
organization's exempt purposes.3 °1
In addition to the IRS's dubious position, this UBIT-based framework is
not without criticism. In response to the ABA Health Section's proposed reve-
nue ruling, a practitioner submitted a letter to the director of the IRS's Exempt
Organization division raising concerns regarding private benefit. 30 2 The con-
cerns raised were specific to Situation 2 of the proposed revenue ruling, where
the joint venture agreement did not require compliance with the community
benefit standard or impose a charity care policy, and the board-adopted busi-
ness plan emphasized profitability of the venture's operations.30 3 In the letter,
the author disagreed with the ABA Health Section's statement in the proposed
revenue ruling that "the private benefit test does not apply in determining
whether an activity is subject to the unrelated business income tax.' ' 3° 4 The
author was concerned that the ABA's statement was "tantamount to saying that
297 Colombo, Death of Health Care, supra note 282, at 525. Specifically, the exempt
organization's control of the joint venture entity may be relevant in analyzing whether a
business activity is "related" or "unrelated" for UBIT purposes.
298 See infra notes 328-36 and accompanying text.
299 See supra notes 238-50 and accompanying text.
300 See supra note 281 and accompanying text.
31 See supra notes 278-81 and accompanying text.
302 Sarah C. Harlan, Harlan Letter to IRS on Ancillary Joint Venture Proposal, 2002 TAX
NOTES TODAY, Oct. 10, 2002, at 197-14.
303 See supra notes 242-48 and accompanying text.
30 Harlan, supra note 302; see also supra note 245 and accompanying text.
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UBI [unrelated business income] and private benefit are mutually exclusive, or
that the existence of UBI renders irrelevant the simultaneous existence of pri-
vate benefit.
30 5
In contrast, the author believed that under the facts of Situation 2 the issue
of whether private benefit was conferred on the for-profit participants is depen-
dent on whether the venture's activity is related or unrelated to the exempt
participant's (i.e., the hospital's) tax-exempt purposes.3"6 Under the facts of
Situation 2, a portion of the hospital's exempt assets, albeit insubstantial, were
exempt from tax when earned or received as donations and are now being used
to "assist physicians to avoid treating Medicare, Medicaid and charity patients,"
which the author contends is directly opposite of the hospital's exempt mis-
sion.30 7 Even if the hospital only contributed an insubstantial amount of its
exempt assets, a joint venture structured under the facts of Situation 2 could
confer "extravagant private benefit, well in excess of any community benefit"
generated by the venture. 30 8 The author noted that an insubstantial portion, or
one percent of $1 billion in hospital revenues, is $10 million, thereby confer-
ring "substantial, lucrative private benefit."3 9
However, the criticism of the UBIT-based analysis of ancillary joint ven-
tures on private benefit grounds can easily be addressed by looking to the oper-
ational test of Section 501(c)(3), which permits exempt organizations to engage
freely in unrelated business activity, provided it is only to an insubstantial
degree. 310 In addition, the very purpose of enacting the UBIT was to eliminate
unfair competition by taxing, on the same basis as for-profit entities, the
income from an exempt organization's unrelated business activities. 3 1 As Pro-
fessor Colombo has argued, if unrelated business activity were not allowed due
to the existence of private benefit, there would be no need for the UBIT as any
unrelated activity would automatically cause revocation of an organization's
exemption.3 2 As to an insubstantial, unrelated activity conferring private ben-
efit on for-profit participants, the IRS does require that any private benefit aris-
ing from a business activity, even if insubstantial in relation to the
organization's exempt activities, must be "incidental in both a qualitative and
",313quantitative sense. Accordingly, the IRS has held an insubstantial unre-
lated activity will not fail the private benefit test provided the activity is con-
305 Id.
306 Id.
307 Sarah C. Harlan, Harlan Replies to Letter Defending Joint Venture Proposal Against
Her Criticism, 2002 TAX NOTES TODAY, Dec. 16, 2002, at 241-61.
308 Harlan, supra note 302.
309 Id.
310 See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(1) (as amended in 1990) which states the rule that an
exempt organization may engage in activities that do not further its exempt purposes pro-
vided it is only to an insubstantial extent. See also Frederick J. Gerhart, Gerhart Responds
to Criticism of Proposed Rev. Rul. on Joint Ventures, 2002 TAX NOTES TODAY, Nov. 27,
2002, at 238.
311 HOPKINS, supra note 50, § 26.1; see also Treas. Reg. § 1.513-(b) (as amended in 1983).
312 See Colombo, UBIT Framework, supra note 282, at 191.
313 Gerhart, supra note 310. See I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,862 (Dec. 2, 1991), available
at 1991 IRS GCM LEXIS 39 (advising that a sale of the hospital's "revenue stream" via a
joint venture arrangement constituted a per se violation of the private inurement prohibition
and a violation of the private benefit doctrine).
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ducted on a reasonable and arm's-length basis, as present in the facts of
Situation 2 of the proposed revenue ruling.
3 14
With respect to the issue of private benefit, Professor Colombo argues that
the IRS has greatly expanded the private benefit test well beyond its intended
meaning and use.3 15 Beginning in the 1970s, primarily in the tax-exempt
health care area, the IRS began its expansive interpretation of the private bene-
fit doctrine. Under traditional common law interpretations, as previously dis-
cussed, the private benefit doctrine focuses on whether the individuals
benefited by the organization's activities constitute a broad cross-section of the
community (commonly referred to as the "charitable class") rather than a spe-
cific or select group of private individuals.3 16 Beginning with the Tax Court's
decision in American Campaign Academy v. Commissioner,3 17 the focus of the
private benefit doctrine expanded beyond the charitable class benefiting from
the exempt organization's activities to private individuals or interests served
"as a result of serving the charitable class." '3 18 The Tax Court adopted a unique
analysis with respect to private benefit, essentially bifurcating the doctrine in
two concepts-"primary" and "secondary" private benefit.3 19 Although the
"primary" benefit of the school in American Campaign Academy was the edu-
cation of its students, which constituted an adequate charitable class because
the school did not limit its admissions to any particular individuals, the Tax
Court nevertheless found that substantial "secondary" private benefit accrued to
the Republican Party because a majority of the school's students were
employed by the Party upon graduation. Based on this secondary private bene-
fit, the Tax Court concluded that the school was not operated "exclusively for
charitable purposes.
' 3 21
This expanded view and application of the private benefit doctrine has
become the bedrock of IRS analysis regarding joint venture arrangements
involving exempt organizations, culminating in the IRS's promulgation of Rev-
enue Ruling 98-15.32I While the private benefit doctrine has considerably
more application to a whole entity joint venture because all of the exempt
organization's assets and its activities have been contributed to the joint ven-
ture, the application of the doctrine to ancillary joint ventures is less clear.
Professor Colombo persuasively argues that the application of the private bene-
fit doctrine to an ancillary joint venture, which represents only a portion of an
exempt organization's assets and activities, only confuses the real issues at
stake-the potential application of the UBIT and whether there is private inure-
314 Id., citing Gen. Couns. Mem. 37,789 (Dec. 18, 1978), available at 1978 IRS GCM
LEXIS 423 (private benefit only incidental where a tax-exempt hospital loaned money and
rented land to staff physicians but received a market rate of interest the loan and fair rental
value in return).
315 See supra note 282.
316 See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
317 American Campaign Academy v. Comm'r, 92 T.C. 1053 (1989).
318 Colombo, UBIT Framework, supra note 282, at 193.
319 Id. See also HOPKINS, supra note 50, § 19.10(a), at 523.
320 Colombo, UBIT Framework, supra note 282, at 193; American Campaign Academy, 92
T.C. at 1073-1079.
321 Colombo, UBIT Framework, supra note 282, at 193.
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ment.322 Because the very purpose of a joint venture is to benefit both the
exempt and for-profit participants, it is only a natural consequence that certain
private, for-profit interests will also be served.323 Furthermore, the language of
the operational test of Section 501(c)(3) and the UBIT itself contemplate just
this sort of business activity by an exempt organization, provided the level of
such unrelated business activity does not rise to the level that the organization
is no longer primarily operating for exempt purposes.3 24
2. Critique of the UBIT Analytical Framework
While the persuasiveness and viability of Professor Colombo' s UBIT ana-
lytical framework are undeniable, the framework's very weakness is its reliance
on the UBIT, which has its own inconsistencies and uncertainties.32 5 Specifi-
cally, as mentioned above, the weakness lies in categories (3) and (4) of the
framework, which still leaves unresolved the fundamental UBIT issue that
arises in the context of any unrelated business activity-at what level or to
what extent will an organization's unrelated business activities, including an
ancillary joint venture (which generally involves only a portion of an exempt
organization's assets), be considered "substantial," thereby jeopardizing its tax-
exempt status?
In other words, when will a joint venture, which constitutes an unrelated
business activity, be considered truly "ancillary" or insubstantial in comparison
to the organization's charitable or exempt activities for purposes of applying
the UBIT rules? As discussed in the overview of the UBIT contained in Part II
of this Article, the basic tenets of, and case law interpreting, the UBIT do not
clearly resolve this issue.3 2 6 No standard has been clearly articulated and con-
sistently applied that resolves when an organization engages in a more than
"insubstantial" (i.e., too "substantial") amount of unrelated business activity
and, as a result, threatens the denial or revocation of its tax-exempt status.327
Accordingly, the UBIT analytical framework can provide two extremely
divergent end results for an exempt organization that participates in an ancillary
322 Id. at 193-94.
323 Id. at 194.
324 See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
325 Harris, supra note 8, at 29 ("the unrelated business income tax is an imperfect and
'inherently vague' tax").
326 See notes 92-101 and accompanying text. In fact, Professor Colombo acknowledges the
issue of "how much commercial activity is 'too much'," but states that "[tihe best that can be
said is that there are no fixed percentage guidelines for determining the answer to this ques-
tion and that other facts and circumstances (such as the amount of employee time spent on
charitable [exempt] pursuits) may be equally important." Colombo, Death of Health Care,
supra note 282, at 536 n.91.
327 Harris, supra note 8, at 30. In the article, Professor Stephen Schwarz, in commenting on
commercial activities of exempt organizations, identified "two competing camps on the
'impact of unrelated business activities on an organization's exempt status.'" One camp
assumes that an exempt organization can engage in some unrelated business but once the unre-
lated business exceeds a vaguely defined benchmark, exempt status can be revoked .... The
second camp suggests that there is no per se limit on the amount of unrelated business an organi-
zation can engage in, if the organization carries on a charitable program commensurate in scope
within its financial resources.
Id. (emphasis added).
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joint venture, as set forth in categories (3) and (4), respectively-payment of
the UBIT on income from the joint venture or the loss of its tax exemption.
While a pure UBIT-based approach may satisfactorily address ancillary joint
ventures that are truly "ancillary" or represent only a small or insignificant
portion of their overall activities, the approach does leave an exempt organiza-
tion that participates in an ancillary joint venture that comprises a greater por-
tion of its total activities, yet does not constitute a whole entity joint venture
(e.g., forty percent of the organization's activities are attributable to ancillary
joint venture(s)), open to revocation of its exemption under traditional UBIT
standards. Therefore, unless the IRS issues additional guidance providing a
more clear and consistent standard as to what constitutes an "insubstantial" and
"substantial" level of unrelated business activity under the UBIT rules, this
pure UBIT-based approach will leave exempt organizations and tax practition-
ers with the same uncertain result as the current IRS control standard.
B. Quantitative Test Proposal
1. Overview of the Quantitative Test Proposal
Recognizing that ancillary, as opposed to whole entity, joint ventures are
the type of ventures most often used by exempt organizations, Michael I. Sand-
ers, a noted practitioner, author, and professor in the area of exempt organiza-
tions law, has suggested that the IRS should apply "quantitative standards and a
significantly relaxed set of rules" with respect to the federal income tax treat-
ment of such ventures.3 28 Mr. Sanders first calls upon the IRS to provide a
clear statement that ancillary joint ventures do not affect the exempt status of
the exempt participant "simply because of defects in management control" of
the venture, and that Revenue Ruling 98-15 is "not directly applicable to ancil-
lary ventures. '329 Rather, as advocated by Professor Colombo, the IRS's anal-
ysis should center on the UBIT issue.330 The control standard, as prominently
established in Revenue Ruling 98-15 and discussed at length herein, would be
irrelevant in the application of the UBIT rules, especially if the "substantially
related" test is satisfied.3 3'
Mr. Sanders essentially proposes a "numerical test" to distinguish ancil-
lary joint ventures from the whole entity joint venture addressed in Revenue
Ruling 98-15. This test would be based on an exempt organization's total
assets, i.e. assets used both in activities directly related to its exempt purposes
and in other activities. 33 ' The application of a numerical or quantitative test
"would provide a satisfactory bright-line standard [or safe harbor], and would
preclude any need to examine a percentage of revenue" under the [UBIT] rules
and the operational test of Section 501(c)(3). 33 3 Mr. Sanders proposes that ten
328 SANDERS, supra note 6, Supp. § 4.4A(c), at 55.
329 Id. Sanders also notes that private inurement should be possibly be part of the IRS's
analysis.
330 Id.
331 Id. (Sanders notes that in ancillary joint ventures an exempt organization may possess
"effective control" of the venture even though it holds less than a majority ownership interest
or voting rights if there is a large number of for-profit participants in the venture).
332 Id.
333 Id. See also Harris, supra note 239, at 183-84.
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to fifteen percent of an exempt organization's total assets could be used in
ancillary joint ventures without a negative impact on its tax-exempt status. Mr.
Sanders further provides that an aggregation limitation would be reasonable
and appropriate to prevent abuse of such a standard by engaging in a number of
ancillary joint ventures that each fit within the safe harbor. When viewed in the
aggregate, such individual ancillary transactions may no longer be ancillary.3 34
2. Critique of the Quantitative Test Proposal
Clearly, such a bright-line rule combined with an aggregation limitation
would provide a more certain standard for exempt organizations and tax practi-
tioners to apply in analyzing the federal income tax consequences of a contem-
plated joint venture. However, the very inability of the IRS and reviewing
courts to adopt and apply a clear and consistent standard differentiating
between what constitutes "insubstantial" vs. "substantial" unrelated business
activities under the UBIT seems to support the unlikelihood that any bright-line
standard or safe harbor will be adopted with respect to ancillary joint ven-
tures.3 3 5 Furthermore, the lack of a consistent application of any one standard
under the UBIT rules only underscores the difficulty of attempting to devise a
workable bright-line standard for consistent application to ancillary joint ven-
tures. In fact, a review of a sampling of UBIT rulings and cases reveals that a
more facts-and-circumstances approach was utilized in reaching a conclusion
rather than any bright-line rule or consistent measurement.33 6 Notwithstanding
the current realities regarding the application of the UBIT rules, the IRS should
seriously consider adopting some sort of quantitative standard or safe harbor in
applying the UBIT to ancillary joint ventures, or issuing guidance that provides
some alternative resolution to the issue, as further discussed below in Part
IV. 3
37
Regardless of the approach adopted by the IRS, any guidance clarifying
the issues discussed above with the respect to the UBIT rules will ensure that
such rules are an available and effective resource for the IRS in addressing the
issues raised by ancillary joint ventures. Such availability of the UBIT rules,
along with the proposed modifications, is the first-prong in the proposal set
forth below as an alternative to the current control standard.
IV. AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE IRS CONTROL STANDARD WITH
RESPECT TO ANCILLARY JOINT VENTURES
A. The Inadequacy of the Control Standard as to Ancillary Joint Ventures
As previously discussed, to date the IRS has primarily utilized a control
standard in determining the federal income tax consequences of an exempt
organization's participation in a joint venture, ancillary or whole hospital, with
334 Id. at 184.
311 See supra notes 92-101 and accompanying text.
336 See supra notes 92-101 and accompanying text.
131 See infra notes 344-48 and accompanying text.
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for-profit participants.3 38 With respect to whole hospital or whole entity joint
ventures, this Article does not propose that the IRS should abandon the use of a
control standard. In such instances, control of the joint venture is arguably
more warranted because the joint venture is now the sole activity of the exempt
organization. However, in the context of ancillary joint ventures, the IRS's
control standard is less appropriate and economically unrealistic because the
joint venture is not the exempt organization's primary activity and may only
represent an insignificant or relatively small portion of its overall activities
whether measured in time, expenditures, or both. Upon review of the evolution
of the IRS control standard from its origins in the two-prong test of GCM
39,005," 3 9 it appears that the IRS has utilized such a standard primarily to pre-
vent two possible negative outcomes from a joint venture arrangement: (i) The
exempt organization's participation in the joint venture will not further its
exempt purposes, thereby potentially causing the organization to fail to operate
"exclusively" for exempt purposes as required under the operational test of
Section 501(c)(3); 3 40 and (ii) the venture confers a benefit on the for-profit
participants that may be substantial, thereby resulting in the exempt organiza-
tion operating more for private than for public benefit (i.e., also violating the
operational test of Section 501(c)(3)).
In the context of an ancillary joint venture, the current control standard
fails to address the IRS's first concern adequately because the determination of
whether an exempt organization's participation in such a venture will cause it
to fail the operational test of Section 501(c)(3) depends almost entirely on
whether the activities conducted by the joint venture are related or unrelated to
the organization's exempt purposes. In making such a determination, the UBIT
regime, with its origins in the operational test, provides a more appropriate and
viable approach than the control standard. For instance, if the ancillary joint
venture's activities at their inception are unrelated to the exempt organization's
purposes, control of the venture by the exempt organization will not change the
fact that its participation in the venture constitutes an unrelated business activ-
ity. Rather, the extent of the organization's participation in the joint venture
and the degree of the organization's other unrelated business activities in rela-
tion to its overall exempt activities or function is determinative.
"I As previously discussed, Rev. Rul. 98-15 relies almost exclusively on the exempt organ-
ization's control of the joint venture in determining the federal income tax consequences of
the organization's participation in a whole hospital joint venture. See supra note 173 and
accompanying text. As to ancillary joint ventures, the IRS, until recently, has similarly
relied on such a control standard in making its determination. In its most recent ruling on
ancillary joint ventures (Rev. Rul. 2004-51), the IRS deviates from such standard and per-
mits the exempt organization and for-profit participant to share control equally, but neverthe-
less relies on the exempt organization's exclusive control over the activity of the joint
venture (which furthers the organization's exempt purposes) in reaching its favorable con-
clusion. As discussed herein, Rev. Rul. 2004-51 shows some progress on the IRS's part, but
still fails to address ancillary joint ventures where the exempt organization lacks equal or
greater control over the venture and/or its activities. See supra notes 278-81 and accompa-
nying text.
3 See supra notes 121-29 and accompanying text.
340 See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text for a discussion of the operational test of
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
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As to the IRS's second concern with respect to private benefit, this Article
has already discussed in the context of the UBIT-based approach that private
benefit to the for-profit participant in an ancillary joint venture is a natural
consequence of the venture and, as with unrelated business activity under the
UBIT, an insubstantial amount can occur without jeopardizing an organiza-
tion's exemption. 34 1 Therefore, it seems that the IRS should place less empha-
sis on whether private benefit is being conferred in the context of an ancillary
joint venture and more focus on the amount of the benefit, particularly in the
form of the venture's earnings, being conferred to the for-profit participants and
whether the private inurement prohibition is implicated.34 2 As discussed
below, the IRS acknowledges in its own internal guidelines that joint ventures
are ripe for private inurement risk.3 43 To address this risk, the IRS needs to
employ an already available resource more effectively-namely, the intermedi-
ate sanctions rules, which are discussed in greater detail below.
B. The Alternative Proposal
In offering an alternative to the current IRS utilization of a control stan-
dard, this Article makes a simple, yet significant, observation-the IRS need
only use resources already in its possession, with some modification, to more
adequately and effectively determine the federal income tax consequences of an
exempt organization's participation in an ancillary joint venture. Accordingly,
this Article proffers an alternative, two-pronged approach. First, this Article
proposes that the IRS utilize the UBIT, as discussed in Professor Colombo's
and Mr. Sander's proposals, to determine whether an exempt organization fur-
thers its own exempt purposes through its participation in the ancillary joint
venture. However, as stated above, in order for the UBIT to be truly effective
in such instances, the IRS will need to provide additional guidance in the form
of clearer and more consistently-applied standards as to what amount of time,
expenditures, or both, will constitute more than an insubstantial versus a sub-
stantial amount of unrelated business activity.
One alternative, as proposed by Mr. Sanders, is for the IRS to issue and
adopt a defined, quantitative standard. For instance, the IRS could borrow the
meaning of "substantially all" used in the corporate reorganization context (i.e.,
at least ninety percent of the fair market value of the net assets and at least
341 See supra notes 68-70, 315-24 and accompanying text. See also Paul Streckfus, Ancil-
lary Joint Ventures May Involve Exemption Risk, 106 TAx NOTES, Jan. 31, 2005, at 603
(Author asserts that, in the absence of private inurement, the "majority view" is that an
exempt organization's exemption "is safe in any situation in which the activities conducted
by a joint venture are an insubstantial part of the EO's [exempt organization's] activities,
even when those activities result in substantial or excessive private benefit to the for-profit
partner.").
342 For the proposition that the concepts of private benefit and private inurement overlap
and the intermediate sanctions rules can impact both concepts, see supra note 75 and accom-
panying text.
313 See infra note 351 and accompanying text. See also SANDERS, supra note 6, § 1.16, at
222 ("The first concern [with having an exempt organization as a joint venture partner] is
whether any of the financial or nonfinancial arrangements contemplated by the joint venture
results in the inurement of any portion of the exemption organization's earnings to an
officer, director, founder . . . of the exempt organization.").
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seventy percent of the fair market value of the gross assets held by the target
corporation immediately prior to the transfer)344 to determine what is an
"insubstantial" amount for UBIT purposes (i.e., the remainder). In other words,
the IRS should adopt a standard setting forth the amount of assets an exempt
organization can contribute to an ancillary joint venture without jeopardizing its
exemption. In the reorganization context, the IRS's primary concern is that a
sufficient amount of the target corporation's assets is being transferred to the
acquiring corporation in order for the transaction to be tax-free in whole or in
part. Although the facts are converse, the IRS's concern is similar in the ancil-
lary joint venture context-namely, that the exempt organization not transfer
too much of its assets (i.e., retain a substantial amount of its assets) in order to
continue to meet the operational test under Section 501 (c)(3). Furthermore, the
rulings and case law interpreting the "substantially all" standard in the reorgan-
ization context could be similarly useful in the application of the UBIT rules to
ancillary joint ventures.34 5
As an alternative to devising a bright-line, quantitative standard that can
be consistently applied in most situations, the IRS might consider adopting a
variation of the intermediate sanctions regime currently applied in the context
of private inurement, as described in detail below, to address situations where
an exempt organization's unrelated business activities are more thim an insub-
stantial amount of its total exempt activities, yet not at a level that the IRS feels
is injurious to the organization's tax-exempt status.3 46 The use of such a UBIT
intermediate sanctions regime would permit the IRS to retain its current facts-
and-circumstances approach in determining whether the amount of an exempt
organization's unrelated business activity is substantial. If the amount of an
exempt organization's unrelated business activity is more than insubstantial
based on the facts and circumstances (i.e., "excess" unrelated business activity),
the IRS would have the option to impose some sort of additional penalty, such
as a higher rate of tax than otherwise imposed by the UBIT rules or an addition
to tax, either of which is less severe than the revocation of an organization's
tax-exempt status. In addition to assessing a penalty in a situation involving
excess unrelated business activity, the IRS could require "correction" (as man-
dated in the private inurement context)3 4 7 by the exempt organization whereby
the organization either divests itself of all or a portion of its interests in an
unrelated business activity or activities to the extent of such excess amount, or
4 I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(C) (2004) (failing to define "substantially all"). For purposes of
obtaining a private letter ruling on a proposed reorganization, the IRS's advance ruling
guidelines provide that the "substantially all" requirement will be met if the proposed trans-
fer of assets satisfies such 90 percent and 70 percent tests. See Rev. Proc. 77-37, 1977-2
C.B. 568 and Rev. Proc. 86-42, 1986-2 C.B. 722.
115 I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(C) (2004); see also, e.g., Comm'r v. First Nat'l Bank of Altoona, 104
F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 309 U.S. 691 (1940); Pillar Rock Packing Co. v.
Comm'r, 90 F.2d 949 (9th Cir. 1937); National Bank of Commerce of Norfolk v. U.S., 158
F. Supp. 887 (E.D. Va. 1958); Rev. Rul. 78-47, 1978-1 C.B. 113; Rev. Rul. 57-518, 1957-2
C.B. 253.
346 See infra notes 355-81 and accompanying text. Obviously, an adoption of such a regime
would require amendments to statutory provisions implementing the UBIT, which would
require Congressional involvement.
347 See infra note 378 and accompanying text.
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modify one or more of such activities to meet the "substantially related" stan-
dard under the UBIT rules (i.e., no longer qualify as an unrelated business
activity).34 8 As previously stated, regardless of the approach adopted by the
IRS, any guidance clarifying the issues with respect to the UBIT rules will
ensure that such rules are an available and effective resource for the IRS in
addressing the issues raised by ancillary joint ventures.
The use of a UBIT-based approach addresses only one-half of the two
underlying reasons for the IRS's use of a control standard. Accordingly, this
Article also proposes that the IRS should more effectively utilize the intermedi-
ate sanctions rules, including the release of additional guidance, to address the
potential of too much financial benefit being conferred to the for-profit partici-
pants pursuant to the joint venture arrangement. Because the very purpose of
such intermediate sanctions rules under Section 4958"' was to give the IRS
options between the two widely-divergent ends of either maintaining or revok-
ing tax-exempt status in instances of impermissible private inurement (i.e., too
much financial benefit), these rules provide the IRS with an effective and more
appropriate resource to address any such issues raised in an ancillary joint ven-
ture arrangement.
Although Section 4958 and the regulations thereunder do not directly
address joint ventures between exempt organizations and for-profit entities, the
potential impact of intermediate sanctions on such ventures should not be
underestimated or overlooked, because joint ventures by their very nature raise
the real possibility of private inurement. 350 This possibility is not completely
unknown to the IRS, which acknowledges in its Hospital Audit Guidelines that
"[j]oint ventures between taxable and exempt parties must be carefully
examined for [private] inurement. ' 351 Neither the IRS nor scholars and com-
mentators in the exempt organizations area have discussed the availability and
application of the intermediate sanctions rules in determining the proper federal
income tax treatment of such ventures in any great detail, although such availa-
bility and application are often mentioned in the context of joint venture
arrangements. 2 This lack of discussion may be due, in part, to the difficulty
in determining whether such rules can apply in the joint venture context-spe-
348 See supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text for a discussion of unrelated and related
business activities.
319 See infra notes 358-81 and accompanying text.
350 See SANDERS, supra note 6, Supp. § 5.4, at 70, and Supp. § 11.3, at 151-67 ("Compli-
ance with the guidelines of the intermediate sanctions provisions is particularly important in
regard to joint ventures between for-profit and nonprofit organizations. . . . [W]henever
nonprofits engage in a transaction with one or more for-profit entities, the potential for
impermissible benefit and inurement issues is inherent.").
351 IRS EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS EXAMINATION GUIDELINES HANDBOOK (IRM 7(10)(69)
§ 333, § 333.4(2) (hereinafter, HOSPITAL AUDIT GUIDELINES), reproduced by IRS for broader
dissemination in Announcement 92-83, 1992-22 I.R.B. 59.
352 To date, in administrative rulings, IRS continuing education material and overall legal
publications, the intermediate sanctions seem to be discussed primarily in the health care
field and most often in the context of executive or physician compensation, or physician
recruitment. Cf SANDERS, supra note 6, § 11.3(c), where Sanders discusses that there are
numerous reasons as to the importance of the intermediate sanctions in nonprofit participa-
tion in joint ventures. First, the IRS typically scrutinizes such ventures for the existence of
excess benefit and private inurement. Second, several forms of compensation typical in the
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cifically, whether the requisite "disqualified person" and "excess benefit," each
of which is defined and discussed below, exist in a particular joint venture
arrangement.35 3
In analyzing the viability of the alternative proposal, this Article has already dis-
cussed the strengths and weaknesses of the UBIT prong of the proposal, including the
need for additional IRS guidance therein. Accordingly, this Article will next provide
a necessary overview of the enactment of Section 4958 and a primer on the regula-
tions promulgated thereunder. This Article will then discuss the application of the
intermediate sanctions rules in the ancillary joint venture context, focusing primarily
on the "disqualified person" and "excess benefit transactions" components of the
rules. Although this Article does not attempt to address and resolve the myriad of
issues that may arise in applying intermediate sanctions to ancillary joint ventures, it
nevertheless attempts to establish the viability of using such sanctions to more prop-
erly determine the federal income tax treatment of ancillary joint ventures and to
address the IRS concerns that led to its use of the control standard. Finally, this
Article will address the potential criticisms of the second prong of this alternative
proposal.
C. A Primer On Intermediate Sanctions
354
1. Historical Overview
As previously discussed, Section 501(c)(3) contains an absolute prohibi-
tion on the inurement of any of an exempt organization's net earnings to private
individuals, commonly referred to as "insiders. 3 55 The term "insiders" is used
to describe individuals that have a relationship with the exempt organization in
which they can exert influence and affect decision making. Prior to 1996, the
sole enforcement mechanism available to the IRS with respect to organizations
exempt under Section 501(c)(3), other than private foundations (i.e., organiza-
tions classified and referred to as "public charities" 356), that participated in
transactions with private individuals or for-profit entities that resulted in imper-
missible private inurement was revocation of the organization's tax-exempt sta-
health care sector invite IRS scrutiny (e.g., incentive compensation, revenue-sharing, and
physician recruitment).
313 Id. (Sanders does note that the recipient of any excess benefit must be an "insider" in
order for any sanctions to be imposed).
351 See Lisa D. McLaughlin & Nicholas A. Mirkay, Traps for the Unwary: Exempt
Organizations' Compliance With The Intermediate Sanctions Rules and Lobbying and
Political Campaigning Prohibitions, 49 ST. Louis B.J. 18 (Spring 2003). Portions of the
discussion on intermediate sanctions are reprinted with the permission of the co-author, the
Bar Association of Metropolitan St. Louis and the St. Louis Bar Journal.
311 See supra notes 58-67 and accompanying text. The private inurement prohibition is
similarly imposed on organizations exempt under I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) (2004).
356 An organization that meets the requirements of I.R.C. § 501 (c)(3) (2004) is either classi-
fied as a (i) "public charity" under one of the four provisions of I.R.C. § 509(a) (2004) (such
provisions based primarily on an organization's sources of financial support), or (ii) a "pri-
vate foundation." An organization is considered a private foundation if it does not meet the
requirements of any of such I.R.C. § 509(a) provisions. A private foundation typically
receives contributions from only a few individuals or entities, whereas a public charity typi-
cally receives its income from a broader segment of the general public in the form of gifts,
contributions, or receipts from performance of services. A private foundation is subject to its
own set of excise tax rules governing "self-dealing" transactions (I.R.C. § 4941 (2004)) or
transactions that fail to accomplish a charitable purpose (I.R.C. § 4945 (2004)).
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tus. This revocation remedy was often viewed as "unduly harsh," considering
that the amount of private inurement may be relatively small in proportion to
the exempt organization's total assets and that revocation of exempt status pun-
ishes the exempt organization and its charitable beneficiaries rather than the
insider who benefits from the inurement.35 7
To address these concerns, Congress enacted Section 4958 as part of the
Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2 in 1996,358 empowering the IRS to impose penalty
excise taxes or "intermediate sanctions" on exempt organization insiders (now
referred to as "disqualified persons," as discussed below) who benefit from
"excess benefit transactions" with exempt organizations. These sanctions are
less severe than revocation of an organization's exempt status, thus the term
"intermediate sanctions." Such sanctions are intended to be the penalty of
choice in transactions where the excess benefit conferred by an exempt organi-
zation "does not rise to such a level as to call into question whether, on the
whole, the organization functions as an exempt charitable or social welfare
organization."3 9 The Treasury Department issued both proposed and tempo-
rary regulations interpreting and implementing Section 4958, with final regula-
tions being issued and effective on January 22, 2002 (hereinafter, the
'Regulations' ).360
2. Statutory and Regulatory Overview
The key to understanding the imposition of intermediate sanctions under
Section 4958 is to be familiar with the terminology utilized, in the statute and
the Regulations.
An "applicable tax-exempt organization" ("ATEO") is an organization
described in either Section 501(c)(3) or (c)(4) and exempt from tax at any time
during a five-year period ending on the date of an excess benefit transaction
(referred to as the "lookback period"). 361' As explained above, only organiza-
tions exempt under Section 501(c)(3) and classified as public charities under
Section 509(a) are included in this definition.362
A "disqualified person" is any person who, during the lookback period,
was "in a position to exercise substantial influence over the affairs" of an
ATEO. 3 6 3 Certain family members and thirty-five-percent-owned entities of a
311 See SANDERS, supra note 6, Supp. § 5.4, at 96; see also HOPKINS, supra note 50, § 19.11
358 Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, Pub. L. No. 104-168, § 1311(a), 110 Stat. 1452, 1475-77
(1996) (added I.R.C. § 4958, effective for excess benefit transactions occurring on or after
Sept. 14, 1995).
359 HOPKINS, supra note 50, § 19.11(i), at 540; see also H. REP. No. 104-506, at 59 n.15
(1996) which states:
In general, the intermediate sanctions are the sole sanction imposed in those cases in which the
excess benefit does not rise to a level where it calls into question whether, on the whole, the
organization functions as a charitable or other exempt organization. In practice, revocation of
tax-exempt status, with or without the imposition of excise taxes, would occur only when the
organization no longer operates as a charitable organization.
360 See Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-1 et al. (2002).
361 I.R.C. § 4958(e) (2004).
362 Id.
363 Id. at § 4958(f)(1)(A) (2004).
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disqualified person are statutorily defined as being disqualified persons. 36
Under the Regulations, certain persons are deemed to have substantial influ-
ence including voting members of the governing body of the organization
(board of directors or trustees) and certain officers or positions with similar
authority (presidents, chief executive officers, chief operating officers, treasur-
ers).365 Certain facts and circumstances can also lead to the determination that
substantial influence is present, which will be discussed in greater detail
below.
3 66
An "organization manager" is any officer, director or trustee of an ATEO,
including an individual having power or responsibilities similar to one of those
persons. 367 Generally, an independent contractor (e.g., an attorney, accountant,
or investment advisor) or a person who can recommend but not implement
action without another's approval are not deemed to be organization
managers. 368
Excise taxes under Section 4958 can only be imposed in instances where
an "excess benefit transaction" (an "EBT") occurs.3 69 An EBT is defined as a
transaction in which an economic benefit is provided by an ATEO directly or
indirectly to any disqualified person and the value of the economic benefit pro-
vided by such ATEO exceeds the value of the consideration,37 ° including the
performance of services, received in return (i.e., the "excess benefit").37" ' In
determining whether an EBT has occurred, all consideration and benefits
exchanged directly between a disqualified person and the ATEO, or indirectly
through a controlled entity or intermediary of the ATEO, must be taken into
account.37" Generally, most components of compensation, whether or not
included in the recipient's gross income, are considered in determining reason-
364 Id. at § 4958(f)(1) (2004). I.R.C. § 4958(f)(3) defines a "35% controlled entity" as
including: (i) a corporation in which a person described in I.R.C. § 4958(f)(1)(A) or (B) (a
person in a position to exercise substantial influence over the applicable tax-exempt organi-
zation ("ATEO") during the five-year period ending on the date of the transaction in ques-
tion, and certain members of such a person's family) "own[s] more than 35% of the total
combined voting power, (ii) a partnership in which such persons own more than 35% of the
profits interest, and (iii) a trust or estate in which such persons own more than 35% of the
beneficial interest."
365 See Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-3(c) (2002). The Regulations also specify certain persons not
considered to have substantial influence over the exempt organization's affairs including
another organization exempt under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2004), and non-highly-compensated
employees as defined under I.R.C. § 414(q)(1)(B)(i) (2004), provided the employee does not
meet any of the I.R.C. § 4958(f)(1) definitions nor constitutes a substantial contributor.
Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-3(d) (2002).
366 See Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-3(e) (2002) and infra notes 386-94 and accompanying text.
367 I.R.C. § 4958(f)(2) (2004).
368 See Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-1(d)(2) (2002).
369 I.R.C. § 4958(f)(l)(A) (2004).
310 In determining the value of economic benefits for purposes of I.R.C. § 4958 (2004), the
Regulations provide that the value of the property, including the right to use the property, is
the fair market value of such property or right. The value of services is "the amount that
would ordinarily be paid for like services by like enterprises (whether taxable or tax-exempt)
under like circumstances (i.e., reasonable compensation)." Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-4(b)(1)(i),
(ii) (2002).
371 I.R.C. § 4958(c)(1) (2004).
372 See Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-4(a) (2002).
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ableness under Section 4958. 373 EBTs can arise in a variety of situations and
transactions with disqualified persons including, but not limited to, compensa-
tion, loans, and revenue-sharing arrangements. Section 4958 does provide an
exception, commonly referred to as the "initial contract exception," pursuant to
which any non-discretionary, fixed payment received pursuant to an initial con-
tract executed by the ATEO and an individual who is not a disqualified person
immediately prior to the contract's execution is not considered an EBT.
3 74
The Regulations provide a "rebuttable presumption" for compensation
arrangements. Under such presumption, compensation is presumed to be rea-
sonable and transfers of property or rights to use property are presumed to be at
fair market value provided certain conditions are met, including the gathering
of comparable data from other similarly-situated organizations. 375 If the pre-
sumption is adequately invoked, the IRS may only rebut the presumption if it
possesses "sufficient contrary evidence to rebut the probative value of the com-
parability data relied upon by the [ATEO's] authorized body."37 6 This rebutta-
ble presumption is the key component in complying with the intermediate
sanctions rules.377
The amount of potential excise taxes imposed under Section 4958 can be
substantial. Disqualified persons are subject to a first-tier tax of twenty-five
percent of the amount of the Excess Benefit. If the EBT is not "corrected"
within a specified period of time, 37 8 a second-tier tax of 200 percent can also be
imposed on the disqualified person. If a tax is imposed on the disqualified
person, a separate excise tax of ten percent of the Excess Benefit can also be
imposed on each organization manager who "knowingly" '3 79 participated in or
13 See Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-4(b)(l)(ii)(B)(3) (2002) for other compensatory benefits
included in such a determination.
374 See Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-4(a)(3) (2002) for defined terms and additional discussion.
375 Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6(c) (2002). The requirements for meeting the presumption are:
(i) the arrangement or transfer must be approved in advance by the ATEO's governing board
composed of disinterested directors; (ii) the governing board must obtain "comparable data"
in making its determination (e.g., compensation paid by similarly-situated organizations,
both taxable and tax-exempt, for functionally comparable positions, or current independent
appraisals establishing a property's value); (iii) the governing board documents its determi-
nation; and (iv) the payment is fixed or determined according to a specified fixed formula
that is subject to a stated cap. Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6(a), (d) (2002).
376 Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6(b) (2002).
377 See Steven T. Miller, Rebuttable Presumption Procedure is Key to Easy Intermediate
Sanctions Compliance, http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/m4958a2.pdf (last visited Aug. 25,
2005) (discussing the presumption and provides a checklist for organizations-use in comply-
ing with the regulations).
378 In order to correct an EBT, the disqualified person must: (i) undo the Excess Benefit to
the extent possible; and (ii) take any additional measures necessary to place the ATEO in a
financial position no worse than if the disqualified person had been dealing with the ATEO
under the "highest fiduciary standards." Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-7(a) (2002). The disquali-
fied person may also return the property to the ATEO to correct the EBT if such transaction
involved specific property and the ATEO consents. Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-7(a), (b)(4).
(2002).
379 "Knowing" means that a person has actual knowledge, not reason to know, of facts
sufficient to determine that the transactions in an EBT and negligently fails to make a rea-
sonable attempt to ascertain that it is or in fact knows that it is one. Reliance on professional
advice can negate this knowledge element. Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-1(d)(4) (2002).
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approved such EBT, unless such participation was not "willful '38' and was due
to "reasonable cause. '381 No tax is imposed on the ATEO itself.
D. Applying the Intermediate Sanctions Rules to Ancillary Joint Ventures
1. The Disqualified Person in an Ancillary Joint Venture
In order for the IRS to use these intermediate sanctions effectively in a
joint venture setting, the venture must necessarily involve a disqualified person
and confer excess benefit to such a person. As discussed above, the statutory
definition of a disqualified person includes any person who, during the look-
back period, was "in a position to exercise substantial influence over the
affairs" of an exempt organization, and certain family members and thirty-five-
percent-owned entities of such a person.3 8 The Regulations define persons
that have "substantial influence" to include voting board members of the
exempt organization as well as certain officers or positions with similar author-
ity (e.g., presidents, chief executive officers, chief operating officers, treasur-
ers).3 8 3 However, a person having the title of a director, trustee, or officer is
not automatically considered a disqualified person, but rather must have the
requisite voting ability or authority to implement decisions of the board and
manage the organization. 384 Accordingly, if an exempt organization enters into
a joint venture with one of its board members or officers, certain family mem-
bers of such board members or officers, or entities in which such members or
officers own at least a thirty-five percent stake, the joint venture could subject
certain of its parties to possible Section 4958 excise tax if excess benefit is
found to exist. However, if the joint venture does not include as a party one of
such persons or entities, the determination of whether any party to the joint
venture constitutes a disqualified person, and, thus, whether intermediate sanc-
tions may be applied, will necessarily involve a facts-and-circumstances
analysis.385
Under the Regulations, facts and circumstances that tend to establish that a
person or entity has substantial influence include, but are not limited to: (i) the
person founded the exempt organization; (ii) the person is a substantial contrib-
utor to the organization; 386 (iii) the person's compensation is based on revenues
derived from activities of the exempt organization, including a particular
department or function of the organization, that the person controls (commonly
referred to as "revenue-sharing"); (iv) the person has authority to control or
determine a substantial portion of the exempt organization's capital expendi-
tures, operating budget, or employee compensation; (v) the person has manage-
380 "Willful" means voluntary, conscious and intentional. However, an organization man-
ager's participation is not willful if the manager does not know that the transaction consti-
tutes an EBT. Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-1(d)(5) (2002).
381 "Reasonable cause" exists if the manager has exercised responsibility owed to the organ-
ization with ordinary business care and prudence. Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-1(d)(6) (2002).
382 See supra note 364 and accompanying text.
383 See supra note 365 and accompanying text.
384 See H.R. REP. No. 104-506, at 58 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.S.C.A.N. 1143, 1181;
see also Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-3(c) (2002).
385 See supra note 366 and accompanying text.
386 See I.R.C. § 507(d)(2)(A) (2004)(defining a "substantial contributor").
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rial authority; or (vi) the person owns a controlling interest in an entity that
constitutes a disqualified person.3 87 For instance, the legislative history states
that physicians, who previously were automatically considered "insiders" with
respect to the tax-exempt hospital in which they were on staff, will be consid-
ered disqualified persons "only if they are in a position to exercise substantial
influence over the affairs of the organization."'3 88 As applied in the context of
joint ventures, the Regulations provide the following example illustrating when
a person or entity has "substantial influence" and therefore constitutes a dis-
qualified person:
A [is an] exempt organization... that owns and operates one acute care hospital. B, a
for-profit corporation, owns and operates a number of hospitals. A and B form C, a
limited liability company. In exchange for proportional ownership interests, A con-
tributes its hospital and B contributes other assets to C. [Subsequently, A's only
asset] consist[s] of its membership interest in C [and it continues to operate exclu-
sively for charitable purposes based on the activities it conducts through C.] C enters
into a management agreement with M, a management company, to provide day-to-
day management services to C. Subject to supervision by C's board, M is given
broad discretion to manage C's operations and has ultimate responsibility for super-
vising the management of the hospital. Because M [(i)] has ultimate responsibility
for supervising the management of the hospital operated by C .... [(ii) A's ownership
interest in C constitutes its primary asset, and (iii)] C's activities form the basis for
A's continued exemption under Section 501(c)(3), M is in a position to exercise
substantial influence over A's affairs. Therefore, M is a disqualified person with
respect to A. 389
The above example involving a whole hospital joint venture is similar to
one contained in the section of the proposed regulations on Section 4958 issued
in early August 1998 (the "Proposed Regulations") devoted to revenue-sharing
arrangements that constitute excess benefit transactions.3 90 As discussed fur-
ther below, revenue-sharing arrangements are particularly relevant to ancillary
joint ventures in health care area where the compensation of executives and
participants are typically structured based on the revenues of the venture.3 9'
However, the revenue-sharing section was subsequently withdrawn and
reserved for future guidance in both the temporary regulations, released in Jan-
uary 2001 (the "Temporary Regulations"), and the Regulations. 392
The above example and the example contained in the Proposed Regula-
tions also illustrate a long-held view by the IRS that a person or entity can
become a disqualified person by entering into a contractual arrangement with
387 Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-3(e)(2); see also SANDERS, supra note 6, Supp. § 11.3(c)(i)(A), at
157.
388 H.R. REP. No. 104-506, at 58 n.12 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.S.C.A.N. 1143, 1181.
389 Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-3(g), Ex. 7 (2002).
390 See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-5(d), Ex. 2., 63 (1998); see also SANDERS, supra note
6, § 11.3, at 357.
391 See SANDERS, supra note 6, § 11.3(c)(ii)(B), at 356.
392 See T.D. 8920, 2001-1 C.B. 654, 664-65, 680; Treas. Reg § 53.4958-5 (2002). The
preamble states that the temporary regulations reserve a separate section governing revenue-
sharing transactions, with the IRS and the Treasury Department continuing to consider com-
ments on the issue and any future guidance will be issued in proposed form. In the interim,
all revenue-sharing transactions should be evaluated under the general rules defining excess
benefit transactions (i.e., Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-4). Id.
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an exempt organization if the contract provides such person or entity with the
ability to control a portion of the exempt organization's income with no effec-
tive limitations or restrictions on possible private inurement.3 93 This position is
especially useful in an ancillary joint venture setting where an operating or
partnership agreement, which governs the venture's operations, may confer
enough control and influence on an otherwise unrelated for-profit participant
(i.e., one who does not otherwise meet the statutory or regulatory definition of a
disqualified person), that such participant can be classified as a disqualified
person under the Regulations' facts-and-circumstances analysis. 394 This is
where the "control" element discussed extensively in this Article can come into
play under the proposal set forth in this Article. Specifically, the for-profit
participant's control over the management and other functions of the joint ven-
ture may result in the participant being classified as a disqualified person and
being subject to possible excise taxes under these rules if evidence of excess
benefit being conferred by the joint venture arrangement is found. Such a clas-
sification, along with any evidence of excess benefit, as discussed below, pro-
vides the IRS with an ability to effectively evaluate such ancillary joint
ventures on a case-by-case basis.
For instance, the above example in the Regulations could be modified to
apply in an ancillary joint venture where the for-profit participant, rather than a
management company, is given broad discretion and ultimate responsibility to
manage the joint venture's activities, along with a greater percentage of the
profits, pursuant to the joint venture agreement. Accordingly, the for-profit
participant is deemed to be a disqualified person with respect to the exempt
organization. Such a result addresses the IRS's concerns about the for-profit
participant retaining too much control over the joint venture's activities while
also providing the IRS with intermediate sanctions as an enforcement tool to
ensure that the for-profit participant (now a disqualified person) will be subject
to excise taxes and a requirement to correct the problem under Section 4958 if
it receives any excess benefit under the joint venture arrangement. In addition,
it provides the exempt organization with the flexibility to structure the joint
venture and craft the operating agreement in a manner that ensures that the for-
profit participant, although classified as a disqualified person, does not receive
any excess benefit.
However, the viability of such a position in instances where the for-profit
participant has no relationship, contractual or otherwise, to the exempt organi-
zation prior to the joint venture has been questioned due to the Seventh Cir-
cuit's decision in United Cancer Council, Inc. v. Commissioner.39 5 In that
case, the Seventh Circuit reversed the Tax Court's determination that a contract
between the United Cancer Council ("UCC"), a charitable organization exempt
under Section 501(c)(3), and a fundraising company unrelated to UCC prior to
... See SANDERS, supra note 6, § 11 .3(c)(ii)(B), at 357.
394 See supra notes 387-89 and accompanying text.
395 United Cancer Council, Inc. v. Comm'r, 165 F.3d 1173 (7th Cir. 1999), rev'g 109 T.C.
326 (1997).
[Vol. 6:21
Fall 2005] RELINQUISH CONTROL!
the contract resulted in prohibited private inurement.396 The Seventh Circuit
rejected the IRS's revocation of UCC's exemption on private inurement
grounds, which was upheld by the Tax Court, finding that the fundraising com-
pany, completely unrelated to the UCC prior to the contract, could not be an
"insider" under the private inurement rules at the time that the contract was
negotiated.3 97 The Seventh Circuit remanded the case back to the Tax Court to
determine whether the contract resulted in private benefit in violation of Sec-
tion 501(c)(3). 398 In the preamble to the Temporary Regulations, the IRS dis-
tinguishes United Cancer Council, which was decided after the effective date
of Section 4958, by asserting that the Seventh Circuit's decision has no bearing
on disqualified person status or the existence of an excess benefit transaction
under Section 4958.
3 9 9
396 Id. at 1176. Under the contract's terms, the fundraising company (Watson & Hughey)
retained approximately ninety percent of the contributions received by UCC to defray the
costs associated with the fundraising campaign. Id.
397 Id. at 1176-79. To the contrary, the Tax Court's decision "established that an entity
which had no prior relationship with the charity [exempt organization] could nonetheless
become an insider for inurement purposes based on the first contract it had negotiated, and
transactions under that first contract could constitute inurement." See Carolyn D. Wright, A
Conversation With Catherine E. Livingston, 23 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 485, 490 (1999).
See also Streckfus, supra note 341, at 603-04, which stated that the government's appellate
brief in the case:
[C]ited with approval a New York Bar Association report stating that insiders may include "inde-
pendent contractors and other apparent third parties," and concludes that "[tlhe bottom line is
that the inurement prohibition serves to prevent anyone in a position to do so from inappropri-
ately acquiring or using a charity's assets ... for private use."
398 United Cancer Council, 165 F.3d at 1179-80. In fact, there was a strong argument that
UCC was being operated to a significant degree for private, rather than public, benefit.
However, the case was settled by the parties prior to any Tax Court decision, thereby restor-
ing UCC's exempt status and leaving the private benefit issue unaddressed and unanswered.
The IRS would have had a strong private benefit argument in that UCC was in fact being
operated to a significant degree for private rather than public benefit because approximately
ninety percent of its contributions were being paid over to the fundraising company pursuant
to the contractual arrangement.
399 The preamble states:
In United Cancer Council, the Seventh Circuit concluded that prohibited inurement under sec-
tion 501(c)(3) cannot result from a contractual relationship negotiated at arm's length with a
party having no prior relationship with the organization, regardless of the relative bargaining
strength of the parties or resultant control over the tax-exempt organization created by the terms
of the contract. The transactions at issue in United Cancer Council were conducted prior to the
effective date of section 4958. Consequently, United Cancer Council involved interpretations of
the general requirements for tax-exempt status under section 501(c)(3), and not questions of
disqualified person status or the existence of an excess benefit transaction under section 4958.
Nevertheless, at the public hearing and in supplemental comments received after the hearing,
commentators referenced the Seventh Circuit decision and requested that the proposed regula-
tions be modified so that section 4958 excise taxes will not be imposed on the first transaction or
contract between an applicable exempt organization and a previously unrelated person.
The temporary regulations addressed the issue raised by United Cancer Council by providing
that section 4958 does not apply to any fixed payment made to a person pursuant to an initial
contract, regardless of whether the payment would otherwise constitute an excess benefit
transaction.
T.D. 8920, 2001-1 C.B. 654, 661 (emphasis added). See also Carolyn D. Wright, UCC, IRS
Settle Decade-Long Exemption Dispute: 501(c)(3) Status Revoked for Three Years, 28
EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV. 189 (2000). Wright states:
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Nevertheless, in acknowledgement of comments from the public hearing
and subsequent commentary on the impact of United Cancer Council on the
intermediate sanctions rules, the IRS addressed the issue raised in the Seventh
Circuit decision by providing an "initial contract exception" in the Temporary
Regulations, which was retained in the Regulations.4 °" The issue addressed by
the initial contract exception-namely, whether an initial contract between a
previously unrelated person or entity and the exempt organization could result
in such person or entity being classified as a disqualified person-is often
referred to as the "first-bite" rule.4 ' Prior to the Seventh Circuit's decision in
United Cancer Council, the IRS rejected the first-bite rule by including an
example in the Proposed Regulations specifically providing that an unrelated
third party could be deemed a disqualified person by virtue of its first contract
with an exempt organization.40 2
Pursuant to the initial contact exception, any binding written contract
between an exempt organization and a person who was not a disqualified per-
son immediately prior to the contract's execution will not constitute an excess
benefit transaction provided that the contract provides for a fixed payment,
including a fixed formula, and the amount of such payment or the decision to
make the payment is not subject to any discretion.40 3 The exception will not
apply if the parties materially modify the contract. 40 4 At first glance, it appears
that this initial contract exception is a major hurdle for the IRS to clear before
effectively using the intermediate sanction rules in the ancillary joint venture
setting. For instance, even if the operating agreement or other agreement asso-
ciated with the joint venture allows the for-profit participant, who has no deal-
ings with the exempt organization prior to the commencement of the joint
venture, to receive an excess benefit, this initial contract exception will effec-
tively prevent the application of any excise tax even if the joint venture
arrangement results in the for-profit participant constituting a disqualified per-
son.40 5 However, the following statement in the preamble to the Temporary
[Former IRS Exempt Organizations Division Director Marcus S.] Owens noted that Congress
intended those with 'substantial influence' over an exempt organization be considered disquali-
fied persons, which indicates that outsiders could fall into this category. Because Judge Posner
was not interpreting section 4958 in the UCC case, Owens predicts that the final regulations will
look more to legislative history than to the Seventh Circuit's opinion for guidance on the appro-
priate health of the disqualified person definition,
Id.
400 See Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-4(a)(3) (2002).
401 See Darryll K. Jones, Law Professor Criticizes Intermediate Sanctions Regs, 33 EXEMPT
ORG. TAX REV. 419 (2001).
402 Id.; see also supra note 390 and accompanying text.
403 Jones, supra note 401. In order to be deemed a "fixed payment" under this exception, it
must be specified in the contract or agreement or determined by a fixed formula specified
therein. A "fixed formula" may incorporate an amount that depends on future specified
events or contingencies, but no person may exercise discretion as to the calculation or
whether the payment is to be made.
404 id.
405 Despite its acknowledgement of the issue raised by United Cancer Council in its state-
ments regarding the initial contract exception in the preamble to the Temporary Regulations,
the IRS still appears to adhere to its original position that an unrelated person can become a
disqualified person by entering into a contract with an exempt organization, even if the
initial contract exception applies, as shown by the following example in the Regulations:
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Regulations illustrates the IRS's perceived flexibility in circumventing the
exception:
In effect, the initial contract rule contained in the temporary regulations protects from
section 4958 liability those payments made pursuant to fixed, objective terms speci-
fied in a contract entered into before the person was in a position to exercise substan-
tial influence, yet allows for scrutiny under section 4958 to the extent the contract
allows for subsequent discretion to be exercised (which may be subject to influence
by the disqualified person) when calculating the amount of a payment or deciding
whether to make a payment.
40 6
This discretion component was likewise integrated into the definition of a
"fixed payment" under the Regulations. 40 7 For example, if the for-profit par-
ticipant in a joint venture is the managing member of the venture pursuant to
the operating agreement and the agreement provides such managing member
the discretion to make or withhold distributions of the venture's net earnings,
such discretion may be enough to nullify the initial contract exception and
enable the IRS to assert excise taxes if the managing member otherwise quali-
fies as a disqualified person, as discussed above, and receives an excess benefit
under the terms of the joint venture.
2. Excess Benefit in an Ancillary Joint Venture
As previously defined, an excess benefit results when the amount of the
economic benefit conferred by an exempt organization to a disqualified person
exceeds the fair market value of the consideration provided by such person in
return.4 8 The excess benefit is the amount by which the benefit exceeds the
value of the consideration. 40 9 The Regulations acknowledge that any excess
benefit can be conferred to a disqualified person indirectly by means of an
entity controlled by, or affiliated with, an exempt organization (i.e., attribu-
tion).4 10 For instance, an exempt organization may not avoid possible imposi-
tion of intermediate sanctions by using a corporation or partnership, in which it
owns greater than a fifty percent interest, to pay excessive compensation to one
of its executives. 41 ' Accordingly, pursuant to the Regulations' attribution
rules, an excess benefit transaction can occur in a joint venture setting where
the joint venture entity pays excessive compensation or management fees to a
disqualified person.
Hospital C, an applicable exempt organization, enters into a contract with Company Y, under
which Company Y will provide a wide range of hospital management services to Hospital C.
Upon entering into this contractual arrangement, Company Y becomes a disqualified person
with respect to Hospital C.
Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-4(a)(3)(vii), Ex. 7 (2002) (emphasis added); see also SANDERS, supra
note 6, Supp. § 5.4(b)(ii), at 103.
406 T.D. 8920, 2001-1 C.B. 654, 661-62 (emphasis added).
407 Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-4(a)(3)(ii)(A) (2002). Specifically, the Regulations provide that a
fixed formula specified in the agreement "may incorporate an amount that depends upon
future specified events or contingencies, provided that no person exercises discretion when
calculating the amount of a payment or deciding whether to make a payment." Id. (empha-
sis added).
408 See supra notes 370-73 and accompanying text.
409 Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-4(a)(1) (2002).
410 Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-4(a)(2) (2002).
411 See Treas. Reg, § 53.4958-4(a)(2)(iv), Ex. 2 (2002).
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Another possible situation of excess benefit being conferred in a joint ven-
ture arrangement is the contribution of property by participants in the joint
venture to the venture entity in exchange for an ownership interest therein.
Clearly, if the transferred property is overvalued or, for example, if the for-
profit participant receives an interest in the joint venture entity (i.e., benefit)
that exceeds the fair market value of the property transferred to such entity by
such participant, an excess benefit has been conferred.412 The IRS clearly
views joint ventures as possibly conferring an excess benefit as stated in the
IRS's Hospital Audit Guidelines, which provide certain factual scenarios in
which private inurement (or excess benefit) may arise:
(1) participation in the venture imposes on the tax-exempt health care organization
obligations that conflict with its exempt purposes;
(2) there is a disproportionate allocation of profits and losses to the nonexempt (usu-
ally limited) partners (usually physicians);
(3) the exempt partner makes loans to the partnership that are commercially unrea-
sonable (because of a low interest rate or inadequate security);
(4) the exempt partner provides property or services to the partnership at less than
fair market value; and/or
(5) a nonexempt partner receives more than reasonable compensation for the sale of
property or services to the joint venture.4 t 3
Despite the IRS's acknowledgement in other guidance that joint ventures
can create real instances of private inurement or excess benefit, the Regulations
are not explicit as to whether an excess benefit can be conferred in a joint
venture arrangement, absent compensation or other management fees being
paid to the for-profit participant. Specifically, the Regulations do not address
whether a for-profit participant's distributive share from a joint venture with a
tax-exempt participant can meet the definition of an excess benefit.
As previously stated, revenue-sharing arrangements are relevant when dis-
cussing joint ventures, particularly in the context of excess benefit. The statu-
tory definition of an excess benefit transaction, in addition to the one above,
also "includes any transaction in which the amount of any economic benefit
provided to or for the use of a disqualified person is determined in whole or in
part by the revenues of [one] or more activities of the [exempt] organization,
but only if [the] transaction results in [private inurement]."4t 4 In this context,
the excess benefit is the amount of the private inurement.4 15 In the health care
412 In determining whether the transfer of property constitutes an excess benefit transaction,
the Regulations adopt a straightforward approach by determining whether the consideration
paid exceeds the fair market value of the property transferred.
Fair market value" is defined as "the price at which property or the right to use property would
change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion
to buy, sell or transfer property or the right to use property, and both having reasonable knowl-
edge of relevant facts.
Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-4(b)(1)(i) (2002); see, e.g., Caracci, et ux, et. al. v. Comm'r, 118 T.C.
379 (2002) (excess benefit transaction found and intermediate sanctions imposed based pri-
marily on valuation issues).
413 Hospital Audit Guidelines, supra note 351, at § 333.4(3).
414 I.R.C. § 4958(c)(2) (2004).
415 Id. See also HOPKINS, supra note 50, § 19.11, at 535.
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sector, revenue-sharing arrangements are commonplace in ancillary joint ven-
tures involving tax-exempt hospitals and physicians or other for-profit par-
ties.4 16 The distributions from such joint ventures, in and of themselves,
represent revenue-sharing from the ventures' operations.4" 7 In the Proposed
Regulations, the section devoted to revenue-sharing arrangements attempted to
address this issue head-on, although again not explicitly in the context of a
distributive share to the for-profit participant in a joint venture with an exempt
organization. The Proposed Regulations generally provided that a "revenue-
sharing arrangement [could] constitute an excess benefit transaction regardless
of whether the economic benefit provided to the disqualified persons exceeds
the fair market value of [services rendered] in return, [if a] disqualified person
[is permitted] to receive additional compensation without providing propor-
tional benefits that contribute to the organization's accomplishment of its
exempt purpose.4 18 Accordingly, the Proposed Regulations considered an
improper revenue-sharing arrangement, in its entirety, to constitute an excess
benefit subject to Section 4958.4 1 9 Examples provided in the Proposed Regula-
tions further established that an excess benefit transaction could occur when an
exempt organization permitted a for-profit partner in a joint venture to control
the amount of income received by the for-profit, unless the exempt organization
received a "proportional benefit" as the for-profit's benefit increased.42°
The proportional benefit issue as well as a host of other issues raised in
response to the Proposed Regulations ultimately led to the IRS abandoning the
revenue-sharing provision, reserving a section in the Temporary Regulations
and Regulations for future guidance,4 2 1 and providing that all revenue-sharing
416 Thomas K. Hyatt, Revenue Sharing Arrangements, materials for AHLA conference on
Tax Issues for Health care Organizations (October 2001).
417 Id.
"I Prop. Reg. § 53.4958-5 (1998); see also Janice M. Smith, Intermediate Sanctions and
Reasonable Compensation, 44 TAX MGMT. MEMO. 195 (June 2, 2003)
419 Preamble, T.D. 8920, 2001-1 C.B. 654, 660-61.
420 SANDERS, supra note 6, § l 1.3(c)(ii)(B), at 358. Sanders explained that the examples in
the revenue-sharing section of the Proposed Regulations were similar to the analysis used in
determining whether an exempt organization's participation in a joint venture with a for-
profit entity furthers its exempt purposes, referring directly to Revenue Ruling 98-15 and the
analysis thereunder. "In excess benefit analysis," he provides, "the issue is whether the
nonprofit has control over its income stream or whether a person or entity with profit
motives has control." Id.
421 See supra note 392 and accompanying text. As to comments received on the Proposed
Regulations, some balked at a separate standard being applied to revenue-sharing arrange-
ments in comparison to all other transactions while others urged the IRS to adopt a standard
based on approaches taken in prior administrative rulings. Some comments urged the IRS to
make the rebuttable presumption available to revenue-sharing arrangements. Preamble, T.D.
8920, 2001-1 C.B 654. Among other issues, the American Bar Association's formal com-
ment on the Proposed Regulations specifically took issue with the fact that a person's ability
to control activities that generate the revenue on which his or her compensation is based
could be used in determining whether such person was a disqualified person under the regu-
lations. Furthermore, in acknowledging that compensation arrangements that incorporate
economic productivity as a component are common and useful in the health care industry,
the comment states that "[a]t a minimum, we believe that the final regulations should make
clear that a compensation arrangement based on an employees' productivity does not tend to
show that such person has substantial influence absent other facts and circumstances." See
SANDERS, supra note 6, § 11.3(c)(ii)(B), at 358 (citing "American Bar Association Comment
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arrangements should be evaluated under the general provisions of the Regula-
tions defining excess benefit transactions, "which apply to all transactions with
disqualified persons regardless of whether such person's compensation is com-
puted by reference to the revenues of the organization [or venture]. 4 22 Despite
the IRS's abandonment of the revenue-sharing issue in the Regulations and
reservation of a section for future guidance,42 3 the IRS's attempt to address the
issue in the Proposed Regulations does shed some light on the topic at hand.
First, it reveals the IRS's viewpoint that revenue-sharing arrangements, which
are implicit in ancillary joint ventures, are significant sources for possible pri-
vate inurement and excess benefit. Second, it further exposes the likelihood
that the IRS will apply the intermediate sanctions rules to revenue-sharing
arrangements that otherwise meet the requirements under Section 4958 and the
Regulations. Finally, the IRS's reservation of a section in the Regulations to
address revenue-sharing arrangements presents the agency with a current
opportunity to both address instances where ancillary joint ventures might
result in excess benefit to the for-profit participant(s) and provide some mean-
ingful guidance as to the use of the intermediate sanctions in such instances.
Private benefit to the for-profit participant in an ancillary joint venture is a
natural consequence of the venture. To address the IRS's concern that too
much benefit is being conferred by the joint venture arrangement, the second
prong of this Article's alternative proposal recommends utilizing the intermedi-
ate sanctions rules more effectively. For the IRS to do so, it must issue addi-
tional guidance that illustrates more clearly when a for-profit participant
constitutes a disqualified person under the rules and when ancillary joint ven-
tures will result in excess benefit to the for-profit participants. This additional
guidance will not only provide the IRS with options other than revocation to
address joint ventures that confer too much benefit to their for-profit partici-
pants, but it will also increase compliance because exempt organizations and
their advisors will possess better-defined parameters to assist them in structur-
ing their joint venture arrangements with for-profit participants properly.
E. Potential Criticisms of the Second Prong of the Alternative Proposal
Any proposal for change elicits potential criticism and the alternative pro-
posal set forth in this Article is no different. The primary criticism that will
likely be levied against the second prong of this Article's alternative proposal
centers on one of the primary differences between the concepts of private bene-
fit and private inurement-private inurement requires that there be an "insider"
(or disqualified person under the intermediate sanctions rules) where private
benefit can apply where impermissible benefit is conferred on unrelated third
parties or non-insiders.4 24 Under the intermediate sanctions rules, a for-profit
participant that is unrelated to the exempt organization prior to the joint venture
does not meet the definition of a disqualified person because of a restriction
imposed by the "first-bite" rule or the "initial contract exception" in the Regu-
on Intermediate Sanctions Proposed Regulations Under I.R.C. Section 4958," reprinted at
BNA TAX CORE, March 1, 1999).
422 See Preamble, T.D. 8920, 2001-1 C.B. 654.
423 See Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-5 (2002).
424 See supra notes 72 and 73 and accompanying text.
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lations.4 25 Accordingly, the criticism will assert that such rule or exception
effectively prevents the application of intermediate sanctions in numerous
instances.
With respect to that potential criticism, it is important to illustrate the
many instances in which the initial contract exception will not apply, thus leav-
ing open the possible application of the intermediate sanctions rules. Specifi-
cally, the exception will not apply in instances where: (i) The other party to the
first or initial contract already qualifies as a disqualified person for reasons not
relating to the terms of the contract at issue; (ii) it is not the initial contract
between the exempt organization and a person or entity that may qualify as a
disqualified person due to the contract's terms or other changes in their rela-
tionship with the exempt organization; (iii) it is the initial contract, but such
contract is later materially modified; (iv) it is the initial contract and the con-
tract provides a fixed payment or fixed formula, but the amount of the payment
and/or the decision to make the payment is subject to any discretion; (v) it is
the initial contract but such contract does not provide for a fixed payment or
fixed formula, regardless of whether there is any discretion in calculating or
making the payment; or (vi) it is the initial contract but the other party to the
contract "fails to perform substantially the person's obligations under the initial
contract.
' 4 26
Accordingly, there are numerous instances where the for-profit participant
in a joint venture with an exempt organization is not precluded from classifica-
tion as a disqualified person due to the initial contract exception under the
Regulations and, thus, is potentially subject to intermediate sanctions. Further-
more, as previously stated, the IRS's reservation of a section in the Regulations
to address revenue-sharing arrangements presents the agency with the perfect
opportunity to further elaborate on the application of the initial contract excep-
tion to for-profit participants in ancillary joint ventures, especially in instances
where such participants have the "discretion" or other ability to control any
aspect of the decision regarding distribution of the venture's net earnings.
In addition, the initial contract exception or "first-bite" rule is not without
its own detractors or criticism. For instance, Professor Darryll Jones argues
that the Seventh Circuit's decision in United Cancer Council and, therefore, the
Regulations' initial contract exception, "focuses on the wrong moment in time.
The recipient is not an insider at the making of the contract, but neither is the
surplus wealth distributed at that time. Of course there is no profit-taking vio-
lation. 42 7 However, when a distribution is made after the contract is signed,
the recipient's status has changed to that of an "insider" or disqualified person
due to the contract's terms. 428 Therefore, according to Professor Jones, the
Seventh Circuit's decision and the IRS's adoption of the initial contract excep-
tion can result in an exempt organization distributing its profits to an insider or
disqualified person.4 29
425 See supra notes 400-07 and accompanying text.
426 Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-4(a)(3)(iv) (2002); see also supra notes 4033-4077 and accompa-
nying text.
427 Jones, supra note 401, at 419.
428 Id. at 420.
429 id.
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The fact of an unreasonable payment and the recipient's status as of the date of the
unreasonable payment are the sole determinants. Whether the payment and achieve-
ment of insider status were determined by the same contractual arrangement is irrele-
vant to the profit-taking prohibitions [private inurement doctrine; intermediate
sanctions rules] because the harm is identical (a controlling individual is taking profit
from the charity [exempt organization]). 430
Accordingly, Professor Jones proposes in part that the IRS should reject
the "first-bite" rule (i.e., the initial contract exception in the Regulations).4 3t
Clearly, the elimination of the initial contract exception would ensure a broader
application of the intermediate sanctions rules to ancillary joint ventures.
Accordingly, Professor Jones's proposal only further supports this Article's
proposed use of the intermediate sanctions rules to determine the proper federal
income tax treatment of ancillary joint ventures more effectively with respect to
the benefit received by the for-profit participants from the venture.
In addition to Professor Jones's criticism of the first-bite rule, tax practi-
tioners, in response to Congressional concerns with respect to compensation
paid by exempt organizations, have proposed several modifications to Section
4958, including two changes that would limit the application of the first-bite
nile. In response to such Congressional concerns, the Section of Taxation of
the American Bar Association ("ABA Tax Section") submitted a letter dated
September 15, 2004 to the leaders of the Senate Finance Committee addressing
various concerns, including the initial contract exception contained in the Reg-
ulations. 43 2 In the context of determining whether compensation paid is rea-
sonable, legislative staff members of the Finance Committee specifically
expressed concerns as to "whether excluding the initial contract from Section
4958, as the Regulations currently require, is appropriate. 43 3 Upon deferring
to "Congress' judgment that an initial contract exception is appropriate where
the non-exempt party to the contract is not yet in a position to exercise substan-
tial influence over the exempt party," the ABA Tax Section proposes two mod-
ifications to the initial contract exception.434 The first recommendation is to
limit the exception to two years, which the ABA Tax Section stated "will allow
nonprofit organizations the flexibility they need while ensuring that the com-
pensation of recently hired individuals is re-examined under the Section 4958
standards within a reasonable period of time."43 5 The second recommendation
is to extend the rebuttable presumption of reasonableness to initial contracts for
430 Id. (emphasis added).
431 Id. Professor Jones also argues that the private benefit doctrine, as defined in Treas.
Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(d)(1)(ii) and as interpreted by the decision in American Campaign
Academy, is "insufficient to address profit taking to persons who become insiders by virtue
of the same contract by which profit is distributed." Id. Accordingly, he proposes a restate-
ment of the private benefit doctrine to specifically address the inequity currently resulting
from the application of the first-bite rule. Id.
432 Katherine E. Stimmel, ABA Tax Section Recommends Modifying, Not Shelving, Section
4958 Compensation Rules, DAILY TAX REP. (BNA), Sept. 30, 2004, at G-7.
433 Id.
434 Id.
435 Id.
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the two-year period, provided the exempt organization adheres to the proce-
dures set forth in the Regulations for obtaining such presumption.4
36
Clearly, the ABA Tax Section's response attempts to address in part the
concerns raised by Professor Jones with respect to the first-bite rule-namely,
that the rule focuses on the wrong moment in time. By limiting the rule's
applicability to only two years, the ABA Tax Section implicitly recognizes that
an unrelated third party that enters into an initial contract with an organization
can become a disqualified person with respect to such organization by the very
terms of the contract and, therefore, a time limit on the initial contract excep-
tion will eliminate any long-term private inurement or excess benefit that may
result from such contract. Although the ABA Tax Section's recommendations
do not specifically address ancillary joint venture arrangements, as with Profes-
sor Jones's proposal, any limitation on the initial contract exception will ensure
a broader application of the intermediate sanctions rules to ancillary joint ven-
tures. Accordingly, such a limitation only further supports this Article's pro-
posed use of the intermediate sanctions rules to more effectively determine the
proper federal income tax treatment of ancillary joint ventures with respect to
the benefit received by the for-profit participants from the venture.
The current political climate surrounding exempt organizations4 37 and
their activities, as well as Congress's concerns with the effectiveness of the
intermediate sanctions regulations, present the IRS with the perfect opportunity
to revisit not only the effectiveness of the initial contract exception but also the
application of the intermediate sanctions rules to ancillary joint ventures. Any
issuance of additional guidance clarifying and solidifying such application of
the intermediate sanctions rules will not only be effective in addressing Con-
gressional concerns as to exempt organizations' compensation practices, but
should also be effective in providing guidance that is more practical and appli-
cable to exempt organizations attempting to structure transactions and joint
ventures that satisfy such rules.
V. CONCLUSION
The proposal set forth in this Article provides a more viable alternative to
the IRS's current control standard in determining the proper federal income tax
treatment of ancillary joint ventures. The IRS's control standard is inappropri-
ate and economically unrealistic because an ancillary joint venture, by its very
definition, is not the exempt organization's primary activity and, thus, may only
represent an insignificant or relatively small portion of its overall activities
whether measured in time, expenditures, or both. As an alternative to this con-
trol standard, the IRS need only look to the resources already available to it in
the form of the UBIT and the intermediate sanctions rules. This two-prong
approach to determining the federal income tax consequences of participation
in ancillary joint ventures will provide exempt organizations and tax practition-
436 Id. See also Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6 (2002) with respect to the rebuttable presumption
of reasonableness. The ABA Tax Section believes that this second recommendation pro-
vides a "significant motivation to nonprofit organizations to adhere voluntarily to the rebut-
table presumption standards." Id.
43 See supra notes 2-5, 433 and accompanying text.
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ers with more defined parameters in attempting to structure their joint venture
arrangements with for-profit participants.
The proposal set forth herein requires the IRS to consider issuing addi-
tional guidance. First, with respect to the first prong of the proposal, although
the IRS took some initial steps by employing in part a UBIT analysis in Reve-
nue Ruling 2004-51, it nevertheless needs to expand its use of the UBIT to
provide guidance in the context of joint ventures where: (i) the exempt organi-
zation possesses less than a fifty percent ownership interest or does not have
exclusive control of the joint venture's activities; or (ii) the activities of the
joint venture are not substantially related to the exempt organization's primary
exempt activities. In addition, the IRS needs to provide guidance that provides
a more clearly-articulated and consistently-applied standard as to what consti-
tutes "insubstantial" or "substantial" unrelated business activity under the
UBIT rules, which will provide exempt organizations and their tax advisors
with greater certainty.
As to the second prong of the proposal, the IRS must issue additional
guidance, perhaps in the section of the Regulations reserved for revenue-shar-
ing arrangements, that illustrates more clearly when ancillary joint ventures
might result in excess benefit to the for-profit participant and provides more
meaningful guidance as to when Section 4958 and the sanctions thereunder
may be applied to such situations. Specifically, the IRS needs to reconsider the
viability and effectiveness of the initial contract exception under the Regula-
tions not only because, as presently stated, it may effectively bar Section 4958
from being applied to certain ancillary joint ventures that might otherwise qual-
ify as excess benefit transactions, but also because of Congressional concerns
that the IRS and the intermediate sanctions rules are not effectively addressing
the perceived problem of excessive compensation by exempt organizations.
The issuance of additional guidance that defines more clearly how and
when the UBIT and the intermediate sanctions rules may be applied to ancillary
joint ventures can only yield positive results. First, the IRS will be able to
utilize both sets of rules more effectively in determining the proper federal
income tax treatment of exempt organizations' participation in ancillary joint
ventures. More importantly, exempt organizations and their advisors will pos-
sess better-defined parameters to assist them in structuring their joint venture
arrangements with for-profit participants properly.
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